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Summary
Local taxes represent less than 5 per cent of total tax
revenues in Tanzania. However, the large number of these
taxes, together with their unsatisfactory nature, means
that their economic, political and social impacts are
considerably more significant than their figure implies.
This report reviews the main characteristics and impacts
of the existing local tax system. It discusses how the
present tax system emerged, and why it has been
maintained for such a long period in spite of all its
weaknesses. Furthermore, it considers options for reform.
An important component of the ongoing decentralisation
reform in Tanzania is to increase the fiscal autonomy of
local authorities. This policy is encouraged and partly
initiated by the donor community. The above findings
suggest that care must be taken in implementing this
policy. It is unrealistic to expect tha t the present
administration in many local authorities has adequate
capacity and the required integrity to manage increased
fiscal autonomy. In fact, there is a real danger that in the
absenee of substantial restructuring of the current tax
system combined with capacity building and improved
integrity, increased autonomy will raise mismanagement
and corruption.
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Executive summary
1 Introduction
1,1 This report is aimed at contributing to the ongoing debate on fiscal decentralisation -
the devolution of taxing and spending powers to lower levels of governent - in
Tanzania, It explores the main characteristics and performance of the existing local
revenue system, and presents options for reform,
1,2 Improved understanding of the reasons and mechanisms that lead to deteriorating fiscal
situations of local governents is important for the ongoing reform exercise. This
knowledge is also relevant to aid policy, especially in the are as of institutional support
for strengthening public administration, inc1uding tax administration,
1.3 The report draws on the findings ofresearch carred out through 1996 to 1998, The
fieldstudies were conducted in Kibaha District Council, Coastal Region, and Kilosa
DC, Morogoro Region, These studies aimed at providing primar data and analyses
of the capacities and constraints of the local tax administrations, especially in
relation to tax design, revenue collection, incentive problems and service delivery,
In addition, data on tax revenues for about 50 councils were collected from the
Ministry of Local Governent in Dodoma, Data on central governent taxes were
acquired from the Ministry ofFinance and Tanzania Revenue Authority,
1.4 In the following sections we briefly summarse the findings of the study and their
implications for the ongoing local governent reforms,
2 The current local government revenue system
2,1 Local authorities levy a large number of taxes, licences, fees and charges, For
instance, in one council studied more than 60 different revenue bases were applied, not
inc1uding the various sub-groups of individual taxes and the varous tax rates in use,
Moreover, large varations exist among councils with respect to the number of revenue
sources,
2.2 The distinction between taxes, licences, charges and fees is often unc1ear, A number
of levies are referred to as charges although they are really more like taxes, since no
service is rendered directly and exc1usively to the payer. In addition, a wide variety
of fees for forms and permits exist. The primary purpose of such permits is for
regulation, although in many councils they have become mainly a source of local
revenue rather than a control mechanism,
2,3 In spite of the large number of revenue sources, four main sources are crosscutting
almost all district councils, These are development lev y, crop and livestock cess
(agricultural cess), business licences and market fees. In 1997 these sources
accounted for, on average, about two-thirds (66 percent) of the tax revenues in 42
district councils studied. Development levy dominated by contributing 30 percent of
total own revenues, followed by agricultural cess (22 percent), business licences
(about 9 percent) and market fees (5 percent).
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2.4 In a sample of 10 urban councils, the major own revenue bases in 1997 were
licences (33 percent), property tax (21 percent) and development levy (19 percent),
2,5 Large annual fluctuations in the revenue generation of councI1s are observed, For rual
councI1s, these varations may partly be explained by fluctuating weather conditions
since produce cesses are important revenue sources. In addition, we found indications
of revenue shortfall in some councils in election years, particularly with respect to
development levy, This may be due to the influence of politicians (both of the local
and central governents) who advis e (or order) the local tax admnistrators "to relax
on tax collection" and "not to harass taxpayers" during election years,
2,6 The trend describing fluctuations in local governent own revenues does not follow a
linear path, but is betler described by a polynomial fuction (i,e" wave-like or
undulating). However, in contrast to other studies which argue that there is a general
dec1ining trend in the real value of local governent own revenues, we find no general
trend. From a sample of about 50 councils the trend during the period 1992-95 was
dec1ining for some councI1s, while it was increasing in real terms for others,
2,7 The offices of the council treasury (revenue section in particular), the ward executive
offcer (WEO) and the vilage executive offcer (VEO) are the offcial tax cOiiection
centres, In principle, revenues are recorded at all three collection points, and the
books are subject to auditing, In practice, records are often inaccurate and poorly
organised, Data on specific revenue-generating activities at particular collection
sites are rarely kept. Inconsistencies were found between the revenues recorded by
the village executive offcers and the records at the ward leveL. There were also
inconsistencies between the records of the ward and district leveIs, In general,
budgeting, reporting and auditing practices are weak in the councils studied,
3 Qualiative characteristics of the local government revenue system
3,1 Many local taxes perform poorly with respect to the basic principles of taxation.
However, these issues do not appear to be recognised by most local governents,
whose main concern simply seems to be to increase local tax revenues - at almost
any cost. This concern has been encouraged by calls from the central governent to
local authorities to try harder to collect enough revenues to cover the council's wage
bill,
3.2 Some councils have imposed high local taxes on export crops, in conflct with the
national governents development policy to stimulate export production. In Kibaha
DC, for instance, the cess rate on cashew nuts in 1997 represented 20 percent of the
price paid to producers, creating disincentives for producers.
3.3 The effective rates for the same tax item (for instance crops) may differ significantly
among councils, Therefore, producers living in councI1s with high taxes, transport and
seii their products in "low tax councils" where they can obtain higher after tax prices,
In border areas, smuggling has become extensive due to relatively high cess rates on
some crops, for instance on tea and coffee, Thus, peasants dodge and manoeuvre to
avoid the deprivation inflicted upon them by public policy.
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4 How the current revenue system emerged
4.1 The by-Iaw system gives local authorities quite a wide discretion to introduce new
local taxes and to set tax rates, subject to ministerial approval. Due to lack of
capacity and poor co-ordination between the central and local governent only
limited restrictions are in practice imposed by the central leve! on local
governents' tax design, Therefore, the local revenue systems have developed
without much interference from above. This has led to large variations in the
revenue structures of local authorities, and to duplication of local and central
governent taxes,
4.2 Presently all the relevant decision making levels lack the required tax expertise for
designing an appropriate tax system, At the local leve! the serious shortage of
qualified staff at the treasury and planning departments has been noted across almost
all councils. Even the available staff lacks expertise on tax issues. At the ministerial
leve!, experience shows that the main concems with respect to local tax design are
raised by the Legal Deparment; the ministry has no tax experts, However, even if it
contained any they would easily be over-flooded by influx of proposals from more
than 110 councils.
4,3 The stakeholders involved in local tax design reinforce the variations observed
between councils. In particular, the emphasis by local politicians on equity
considerations has led to a fine-tuning of the tax structure in councils where
politicians have the power to influence tax design, Thus, the present local revenue
structure are partlya result of the different interests of the stakeholders involved in
tax design, and partlya consequence of the councils' and the ministry's inability to
understand the financial, economic and social implications of the local tax system,
5 The gap between the statutory and the effective revenue system
5.1 Large gaps exist between the revenue potential and what actually is reported to the
council treasury. Thus, the ratio between reported and projected revenues differs
significantly both between councils and between are as within councils, From a
sample of 27 councils, the effective development levy rate in 1995 varied from TSh
40 (Kilwa DC) to TSh 967 (Makete De), indicating large variations in effective tax
enforcement. The ratio between actual reported levy and projected revenue in wards
in Kibaha DC in 1996, varied from 8.9 percent to 38,7 percent. The corresponding
figures for Kilosa DC were 13 percent and 97 percent.
5.2 The costs of administering the complicated tax structures are high, In some wards in
Kilosa DC the administrative costs oftax collection are far higher than the tax revenues
remitted to the counciL.
5,3 The costs of tax enforcement var between the different revenue sources, Some
revenues are relatively easy to collect because there are c1ear ways to deal with
defaulters. If, for instance, businesspeople fail to pay a licence fee they can be refused
services or c10sed down, Some revenues are not even collected directly by the counciL.
For instance, civil servants pay the development levy through a withholding system,
where the employer acts as the collector, Many taxes are, however, relatively diffcult
to collect. Tax collectors at the ward and vilage levels in Kibaha DC and Kilosa DC
considered deve10pment levy to be the most problematic tax to collect, followed by
crop cess and livestock cess. Tax offcials at the district headquarters also raned
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development levy as the most problematic tax to collect, followed by property and land
taxes,
5.4 Taxes are widely perceived to be unfair, Taxpayers see few tangible benefits in
retum for the taxes they pay, Virtually no development activities are undertaken
through councils' financial sponsorship and, even the existing capacities are not
producing the expected services due to lack of operation and maintenance funds,
The deterioration and in some cases non-existence of public services raises
taxpayers perceptions of exploitation from an unequal contract with governent.
5.5 Taxpayers' resistance to pay adds to the enforcement costs, Collectors often have to
use harsh methods and violence, Roadblocks and the local militia are frequently used
as instrents of tax enforcement. For instance, manned barrers are used to control
buyers of certain crops like cashew nuts in the Coastal Region, The buyer has to
produee the cess receipt befare he is allowed to take any cashew nuts from the distrct.
5,6 Severe sanctions (including strict enforcement and harassment of taxpayers), and
discontent with what people feel they get in retum from the governent promote tax
resistance, and contribute to explain the widespread tax evasion observed, Thus, tax
authorities' unresponsive, disrespectful and unfair treatment of taxpayers may foster
disrespect for and resistance against tax authorities and tax laws, Accordingly, harsh
enforcement and harassment by collectors may induce tax evasion, especially if no
expected services are provided in retum. This also contributes to undermine the
legitimacy of the governent both at the local and national leve is,
5,7 Fiscal corrption is extensive in the councils studied, facilitated by the complicated
and non-transparent tax system, Corrption takes many forms and varies by types of
taxes, methods of tax collection and location, It cuts across all levels of the local
governent, from the village to the district council headquarters, Magnitude in
terms ofthe amounts ofmoney involved seems to rise by the leve! of the counciL.
5.8 Our findings show that the most common type of corrption (also involving large
amounts of money) is embezzlement of revenues by tax collectors. Embezzlement is
the form of tax revenues that does not accrue to the accounts of local governents,
but is siphoned off by tax collectors and administrators,
5,9 In one council studied, evidence was found that large numbers of tax receipt
counterfoils were not returned to the council headquarters as required by the
financial regulations It is reasonable to assume that the counterfoils not returned are
used to embezzle tax revenues, A note from the distrct chief executive supported
this hypothesis, For development levy, we found that the amount embezzled in this
way in 1995 corresponded to more than 35 percent of the council's actual revenues
from development levy, The corresponding figure for 1996 was about 15 percent. In
another case, which we followed over a period of three months, we found evidence
that less than 5 percent of maize cess collected was reported to the council, or to put
it differently, more than 95 percent of the revenues were embezzled.
5.10 Embezzlement also take place through collusion between staff of the council's
treasur department and bank offcials, leading to the non-banng of tax revenues:
Bank officials issue a receipt on the correct amount to the treasury offcial. The
receipt is brought back to the council's revenue offce for control, and is consistent
with the money remitted. However, only a part of the tax revenues is actually
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deposited into the council's account. The rest is shared between the bank officials
and the collectors involved, This method may be sustained over time since what
actually is deposited in the council's bank account is rarely controlled, In early 1998,
the Controller and Auditor General uncovered cases from 31 councils where cashbook-
receipts were not reflected in the bank statements,
5,11 Prolonged embezzlement of large amounts of tax revenues requires the
involvement of relevant senior officials from the councils' headquarters, In one
council we found evidence of a corrption network involving the head of district
treasury, the district revenue inspector, the district accountant and ward executive
officers, Furthermore, the prolonged existence and performance of such corrption
networks requires that:
(i) the tax collectors and tax inspectors are stationed relatively permanently in
their positions, i,e., they are rarely transferred;
(ii) the network is limited to a relatively small number of people in the tax
administration; and
(iii) taxpayers are not directly involved.
5,12 The exc1usion of taxpayers from the embezzlement corrption network is
possible because the tax collectors may indeed provide genuine receipts to taxpayers
on taxes paid. In some cases two sets of similar receipt books are used,
6 Options for fiscal reforms
6,1 Although local taxes represent less than 5 percent of total tax revenues in Tanania, the
large number of these taxes, together with their unsatisfactory natue means that their
economic, political and social impacts are considerably more significant than their
figure implies.
6.2 There is undoubtedly room for improved fiscal and financial management in local
authorities, and improved co-ordination between the different levels of governent.
Measures may inc1ude capacity building, inc1uding training prograres for all actors
involved in revenue mobilisation and collection, Building local administrative capacity
may contribute to reduce revenue losses caused by ineffciencies and corrption,
However, attempts to squeeze additional revenues from poorly designed taxes may
have negative effects on the economy and the society in general. In general, improved
tax adrnnistration cannot compensate for bad tax design, Thus, reformng the tax
structue should precede the reform of tax administration since there is not much merit
in making a bad tax system work somewhat better.
6,3 The capacity of local governents is very weak in tax design, and the resource
requirements for building this capacity at the local level are high, Therefore, in the
short ru, very c1ear guidelines and limits should be given by the central governent
regarding tax design, Furthermore, the current system of approving tax by-Iaws should
be strengthened, In particular, there is an urgent need to improve co-ordination with the
national tax system, Thus, one may consider establishing an expert commttee (a
"Finance Commission") to advise both the Ministers of Finance and Local
Governent on the local governent tax system, This commttee should advis e the
two ministers before the by-Iaw is approved.
6.4 Given the poor performance of many local taxes, any reform programme should
inc1ude the abolition of a large number of these taxes, In particular development
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levy should be abolished, This is a tax that we have found to be costly to enforce,
The levy is extreme1y unpopular among taxpayers and tax resistance is widespread,
Furthermore, the levy represents an extra income tax on formal sector employees.
6,5 A reform should also inc1ude the abolition of nuisance taxes like bicyc1e tax,
livestock levy, entertainment levy, etc" Many ofthe licences should also be abolished
since they rarely have a regulatory fuction, This should also be the fate of many fees
that simply have a high nuisance value and that costs more to enforce than what they
yield in terms of revenues, inc1uding push car fees, cattle trekking fee, bicyc1e
registration fee, etc..
6,6 In particular, there is a ne ed to simplify the licence and fee structures by reducing
the number of rates and coverage. Charges should in principle only be levied when
services are provided, For instance, advertisement board fee, sand fee and business
licences may be retained since they have a certain regulatory function, To avoid double
taxation, fees and licences should be harmonised with central governent revenue
sources,
6,7 The establishment of uniform rates on some major crop cesses at the nationallevel
should be considered, In this context one may consider the appointment of revenue
collection agencies, inc1uding the possibility to centralise the collection of certain
taxes, For instance, cess on export crops could be collected at their points of export by
Tanana Revenue Authority.
6.8 Export taxes should, in general, be discouraged, However, at present many local cess
rates are very high, and thereby discouraging export production, Thus, by abolishing
alllocal cesses and imposing a lower (flat) national cess rate on export crops across all
councils, the effective tax rate on these products can, in general, be reduced, For
instance, a 10 percent tax on the border value of export crops would levy TSh 21
bilion, equivalent to 3,7 percent of total central governent tax revenues in 1997/98,
This amount is slightly less than the total own revenues currently reported by local
governents.
6,9 The distribution of these revenues among local governents can be made on a
derivation basis, with each council getting the same share of the cess originating
from its district. In this way revenue sharing avoids the problems associated with
local governent tax administration and policy harmonisation,
6.10 Land and property taxes have some attractions as local bases since they are
imposed on immobile resources, and therefore are diffcult to avoid - at least in
principle. However, they also have some weaknesses that need to be taken into
consideration before too heavy reliance is placed on them as major local governent
revenue sources. These weaknesses are partly of political and partly administrative
character, manifested in problems of valuation and tax enforcement. In particular, it
is important to seriously consider the adminstrative capacity to maintain assessments
of propert value, Furthermore, the enforcement mechanisms must be carefully
designed to avoid a mushrooming number of cour cases from angr propert and land
owners,
6. i 1 In general, a fundamental requirement when redesignng the local tax system is a
greater concem with the cost-effectiveness of revenue collection, taking into account
not only the direct costs of tax adminstration, but also the overall excess burden to the
economy, inc1uding the compliance costs to the taxpayers, To these aims increased
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staff productivity and reduced losses through corrption are needed, Such
improvements may take a long time to achieve, although a simplification of the local
revenue system should be a positive contribution towards these aims,
6,12 Tax resistance is likely to increase without improvements in service delivery,
necessitating costly and coercive methods of tax enforcement that wil further
undermine the legitimacy of the governent. Improvement in service delivery - a
major objective of public sector reforms in Tanzania - is therefore a necessary
condition to improve tax compliance, Thus, the chaUenges facing the governent
are to improve public service delivery, and to secure fuding to provide basic
services, However, whatever is done to improve the local governent revenue
system, the reality is that local authorities in Tanzania wil continue to be heavily
dependent for their sustenance on fiscal transfers from above. Transfers should
therefore be considered an important component of the decentralisation programme,
6,13 A key element in the ongoing decentralisation reform in Tanzania is the
provision of conditional block grants from the centre to local authorities, These are
planned to be introduced as a pilot project in 35 local authorities in January 2000,
Conditional block grants are earmarked to finance major nationally defined services,
such as primary education, primary health, water supply, agricultural extension and
roads, rather than specific programres, The conditionality refers to earmarking to
certain broad-based services (education, water, etc,), but not to particular budget
lines (personal emoluments, etc,),
6,14 The grants wil be based on minimum standards of service to be defined by the
sector ministries in negotiation with representatives of local governents, These
grants relate only to recurrent costs. Such earmarking of grants wil of course limit
the autonomy of local governents, and thereby partly negating the arguments for
decentralisation. However, imposing conditions may be justified by distributional
considerations, such as the need to ensure minimum nation-wide standards for the
provision of services of national concern,
6.15 Stability and transparency considerations call for formula-based revenue-sharing
and other general-purpose transfer systems, However, in this process of fiscal
decentralisation it is important to be aware of the risks for macroeconomic
management and fiscal discipline. Mechanisms of fiscal transfers may impose
considerably rigidity to the central governent budget. Therefore, substantial
devolution of revenues and spending responsibilities to local authorities can affect
the central governent' s ability to carr out stabilisation and macroeconomic
adjustment through the budget.
6,16 The destabilising potential of local governents ' is greatest when they face no
hard budget constraint. Expectations ofbail-out in case of financial trouble weaken
the incentives to economise on costs, and thus generate resource waste and rigidity
within local authorities, These ineffciencies, in tur, may spil over into macro-
economic imbalances, Thus, short-run macro-economic management considerations
caU for effective limits on local governents' deficits, consistent with national
objectives for growth, inflation and balance of payments,
xm
7 Concluding remarks
7,1 An important component of the ongoing decentralisation reforms in Tanana is to
increase the fiscal autonomy of local authorities, This policy is encouraged and parly
initiated by the donor community. The above findings suggest that care must be taken
in implementing this policy, It is unrealistic to expect that the present administration in
many councils has adequate capacity and the required integrty to manage increased
fiscal autonomy, In fact, there is a real danger that, in the absence of substantial
simplification and restructurng of the curent revenue system combined with capacity
building and improved integrty, increased autonomy may raise mismanagement and
corrption in many councils,
7.2 It is particularly important for the time being to impose hard budget constraints on
the local authorities, through a design of intergovernental fiscal relations that
ensures for the local governents an adequate balance between expenditure
responsibilities and their own revenues, in addition to clearly defined transfers from
the centre,
7,3 It is beyond doubt that large and dramatic changes are necessary to improve
performance and to re-establish legitimacy of the local governent system.
However, the present speed with which the decentralisation programme seems to
impose reforms may prove counter-productive. Furhermore, substantial
decentralisation is likely to make it more complicated for the central governent to
carr out macroeconomic stabilisation through budgetar policies, Therefore, due to
Tanzania's acute fiscal imbalances and its aid dependency, decentralisation should
probably pro gress more slowly and cautiously.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal decentralisation - the devolution of taxing and spending powers to lower
levels of governent - has become an important theme of governance in many
developing countries in recent years (Fukasaku et aL., 1999; Manor, 1999; World
Ban, 1999; Shah, 1998; Devas, 1997), As a consequence ofmuch dissatisfaction
with the results of centralised economic planing, reformers have turne d to the
idea of decentralisation as a reform that would break the grip of central
governent and induce broader participation in democratic governance (Oates,
1998; Smoke, 1994),1 Being closer to the people, it is argued local authorities can
more easily identify people's needs, and thus supply the appropriate form and
leve! of public services (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1991; Rondinelli et aL., 1989;
Oates, 1972). In turn, it is argued, communities are more likely to be wiling to
pay taxes locally where the amounts they contribute can be related more directly
in their eyes to services received (Livingstone and Charlton, 1998; Westergaard
and Alam, 1995). As a result, it is expected, the leve! of tax revenue raised
without excessive public dissatisfaction may be increased,
Yet, both the approach and the results of decentralisation have varied widely
between countries. According to Smoke and Lewis (1996:1281), the limit ed
success is attributed to two factors, First, the decentralisation process has been
resisted or undermined by central governent institutions fearful of losing power
and rationale. Second, many initiatives have been donor driven, over-ambitious,
and not taking into consideration the complex institutional realities that govern the
extent to which, and the pace at which, decentralisation can occur in a particular
country. Oates (1998) argues that the case for decentralisation has often been
made in a very general and uncritical way with little systematic empirical support,
Predictably, the argument for decentralisation has provoked respons e from some
observers who assert that the case for fiscal decentralisation is much-overstated
(Prud' homme, 1995),
Despite the mounting concern, Tanzania is now implementing a local governent
reform, within the framework of the reform of the Civil Service.2 Both share a
common goal: to improve services delivery (URT, 1996), The first phase of
decentralising responsibilities and resources from the centre to local institutions
begins in January 2000 when 35 local authorities will be given additional
responsibilities and decision making powers for public service delivery (Price
Waterhouse, 1998), A key element in this process is the provision of conditional
block grants from the centre to local authorities, Additional reforms include
measures to strengthen local governents' revenue raising, and measures of
revenue sharing between local and central governent.
This report is aimed at contributing to the ongoing debate on fiscal
decentralisation in Tanzania. It explores the main characteristics and performance
of the existing revenue system, and presents options for reform. The paper draws
on the findings of studies carred out through 1996, 1997 and 1998, The
fieldstudies were conducted in Kibaha District Council, Coastal Region, and
l As a "Financial Times" commentator has observed, 'Jf "rollng back the frontiers of the state" was the
policy mantra of the 1980s, then the creed of the 1990s is to roll them downwards" (Flanders, 1995, quoted
in Devas, 1997:351).
2 The new Local Government Act was approved by the Parliament in February 1999.
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Kilosa DC, Morogoro Region, These studies aimed at providing primary data and
analyses of the capacities and constraints of the local tax administrations,
especially in relation to tax design, revenue collection, incentive problems and
service delivery, The studies covered all three councilleveIs, namely the district
headquarter, the wards and the vil age leveIs, Information was collected from a
variety of sources and through different methods, and covered staff members of
the tax administration, local politicians and taxpayers,3 In addition, data on tax
revenues for about 50 councils were collected from the Ministry of Local
Governent in Dodoma,4 Data on central governent taxes were acquired from
the Ministry of Finance and Tanzania Revenue Authority, where we also
interviewed offcials on the relationship between local and central governent
taxation, Furthermore, representatives from the donor community were
interviewed,
The paper is organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the general characteristics of
the local governent tax system, The importance of varous revenue sources is
discussed and the institutional set-up for revenue collection examined, In chapter
3 the performance of the main local taxes is reviewed according to the standard
public finance criteria, Chapter 4 explores how the present revenue system
emerged. It examines the role of the by-Iaw system, and discusses the criteria used
for tax design, Chapter 5 attempts to explain the gap between revenue potential
and what actually is reported to the local governent treasury, Both
administrative and political factors are examined, inc1uding the administrative
capacity to enforce taxes, tax evasion, fiscal corrption and political pressure. In
chapter 6 the outline for a new local governent revenue system is presented,
Finally, chapter 7 conc1udes,
3 See appendix 1, and Fjeldstad and Semboja (1998) for details.
4 Until 1998, the Ministry of Local Government was incorporated in the Prime Minister 's Offce In
September 1998 a new, independent "Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government" was
established.
2
2 The current local government revenue system
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the existing local governent tax system in Tanzania, and
uses data for about 50 councils, Details, however, refer mainly to Kibaha DC and
Kilosa DC, and partly to Dar es Salaam City Commission. Westart by discussing
the importance of various revenue sources, and make a comparison between
councils with respect to tax bases and rates. Thereafter, the institutional set-up for
revenue collection is presented, To give a more comprehensive picture of the local
governent revenue system that cannot be captured by purely statistical
sumaries, a description of methods of payment, reporting and budgeting
procedures follows, We compare the statutory system as described in the laws
with how these functions are carred out in practice,
2.2 The revenue structure
2.2,) Revenue bases
Local authorities levy a large number of taxes, licences, fees and charges, some of
which are listed in table 2,1. The table lists 10 major categories of taxes; 18 major
categories of licences; 41 groups of charges and fees; and 16 items listed as
"othet' revenue sources, The distinction between taxes, licences, charges and fees
is, however, of ten unclear. A number of levies are referred to as charges although
they are really more like taxes, since no service is rendered directly and
exclusively to the payer. An example of this is market fees that are also levied on
people selling goods outside market places, In addition, a wide variety of fees for
forms and permits exist. The primary purpose of such permits is for regulation,
although in many councils they have become mainly a source of local revenue
rather than a control mechanism,5 Thus, in this paper the concept "taxes"
comprises both taxes, licences, charges and fees, if not otherwise is stated,
In spite of the large number of revenue sources, four main sources are crosscutting
almost all district councils, These are development levy (head tax), crop and
livestock cess (agricultural cess), business licences and market fees (see section
3,3 for details), In 1997 these sources accounted for, on average, about two-thirds
(66 percent) of the tax revenues in 42 district councils studied (see table 2.2),
Development levy dominated by contrbuting 30 percent of total own revenues,
followed by agricultural cess (22 percent), business licences (about 9 percent) and
market fees (5 percent),
The four main sources of revenue have dominated district councils' revenue
generation since local governent was re-introduced in 1983 (URT, 1991). In
1987/88, from a sample of ten rural councils, development levy, cess and business
licences contributed with 77 percent of the revenues (Semboja and Therkildsen,
1991:19), Thus, although there is a tendency that their contribution is declining,
they stil account for the major share of the revenues from councils, In a sample of
10 urban councils, the major own revenue bases in 1997 were licences (33
percent), property tax (21 percent) and development levy (19 percent),
5 This system has many similarities to the local revenue system in Indonesia in the 1980s as described by
Devas (1988).
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A: District CouncIls (N=42) 1995 1996 1997 1998
Revenue sources Actual % Actual % Actual % Budget %
Deve10pment 1evy 913,40 24,4 1482,60 27,2 1882,50 30,7 4017,70 30,8
Agricu1tural cess (crop & livestock) 944,20 25,2 1377,60 25,2 1352,70 22,1 3369,00 25,9
Business licences 362,00 9,7 557,50 10,2 522,80 8,5 690,40 5,3
Market fees 204,30 5,5 328,30 6,0 305,50 5,0 480,20 3,7
Other taxes 108,60 2,9 163,50 3,0 285,80 4,7 826,60 6,3
Liquor 1icences 82,50 2,2 94,00 1,7 118,10 1,9 171,90 1,3
Other fees & fines 457,40 12,2 648,60 11,9 758,20 12,4 1657,00 12,7
Miscellaneous 668,60 17,9 804,40 14,7 899,20 14,7 1817,90 14,0
Total 3741,00 100,0 5456,50 100,0 6124,80 100,0 13030,70 100,0
B: Urban CouncIls (N=10) 1995 1996 1997 1998
Revenue sources Actual % Actual % Actual % Budget %
Deve10pment 1evy 292,9 10,9 890,8 17,4 1659,6 18,9 2368,8 17,3
Propert tax 423,2 15,7 965,4 18,9 1869,6 21,3 3184,2 23,3
Licences 712,0 26,4 1359,0 26,6 2918,3 33,3 3825,9 28,0
Industria1 cess 124,0 4,6 223,3 4,4 262,3 3,0 387,1 2,8
Other cess 120,9 4,5 145,7 2,8 191,6 2,2 327,0 2,4
Fees 275,6 10,2 417,4 8,2 493,6 5,6 952,6 7,0
Levies 272,6 10,1 335,3 6,6 345,7 3,9 724,4 5,3
Miscellaneous 474,7 17,6 776,0 15,2 1027,8 11,7 1910,9 14,0
Total 2695,9 100,0 5112,9 100,0 8768,5 100,0 13680,9 100,0
Source: Computed from Price Waterhouse (1998)
As noted above, the number of different taxes, licences, charges and fees is high
and varies between the councils, In 1997, for instance, there were at least 25 types
of revenue sources being levied in Kibaha DC, compared to more than 60 for
Kilosa DC and about 50 in Dar es Salaam City Comrission, These figures do,
however, not take into account the various sub-groups of particular revenue bases,
For instance, in Kilosa DC trade licence and weight and measure lee had 9
components each, In Kibaha, hun ting licence had 10 components (varing with
the type of animal), business licence had 8 components and building inspection
lees had 5 main components and 12 sub-groups (inc1uding inspection fees for the
different components of a building such as foundation, roofing, walls, finishing
and occupation), The by-Iaw on hawking and street trading in Kibaha DC from
1991, specifies in detail 38 different components (inc1uding licences for bicyc1e
repairs, t yre puncture repairs, shoe shiner, car wash, carpenter, firewood, potato
chips seller licenses, etc,),
2.2.2 Tax rates
Some rates are levied on a daily basis, others yearly or taxpayers may choose
between the two options, For instance, market fees are in generallevied on a daily
basis: However, some councils offer the option of paying an annual fee. The
number of tax rates applied on individual revenue components may be high,
Examples inc1ude land tax rate in Kilosa DC where the rate rises with the number
of acres owned, In 1997 seven land tax rates were specified varying from TSh
3,000 for 1-50 acres, to TSh 9,000 for 501-600 acres, In addition, TSh 1,000 was
to be paid for every 100 acres in excess of600.
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Rates on similar revenue bases may also differ very much between councils, This
is the case for development levy, which is levied on an annual basis. Rural
councils, in general, apply flat rates, For instance, in 1997 the development levy
rate in Kibaha DC was TSh 1,000 compared to TSh 2,000 in Kilosa DC, In Bunda
DC, however, a graduated system applies with annuallevy rates in 1996 ranging
from TSh 2,000 to TSh 4,000 dep ending on income, Urban councils, in general,
apply graduated rates or a combination of flat and graduated rates. In Dar es
Salaam, in 1997, a flat rate of TSh 2,000 was imposed on peasants and low
income eamers, while the rate for other persons was 1 percent of annual their
income.
Also for other revenue bases there are large variations in rates between councils.
For instance, in 1997 the annual bicyc1e tax rate in Kibaha DC was TSh 500
compared to TSh 1,000 in Kilosa; and the daily street-vending fee in Kibaha was
TSh 50 compared to TSh 100 in Kilosa, Similarly, the entertainment levy vares
between councils. In Kibaha in 1997 this levy was TSh 3,000 per show, compared
to TSh 20 per person watching the show in Kilosa DC (see table 2.3),
Furthermore, some rates are flexible, In Kilosa, for instance, the open weekend
market fee varies by the type of goods from TSh 10 to TSh 400, Furthermore, the
market fee for identical goods may vary by the size of the container that the good
is kept. Thus, the fish fee in Kilosa varied from TSh 300 to TSh 500 in 1997.
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Table2.3 Examples ofrates in Kilosa DC and Kibaha DC
Rates (in TSh,1997)
Revenue sources Specification Kilosa DC Kibaha DC
L. Development levy Per man above the 2,000 1,000
age of 18
2. Hotellevy Percent of tuIDover 20
3. Crop and IIvestock cess
Maize Per 100 kg 200 200
Paddy (rice) Per 100 kg 200
Sweet potatoes Per 100 kg 200
Cashew nuts Per 100 kg 4,000
Cattle Per animal 200 100
Other 1ivestock Per animal 100 50
(goat, sheep, donkey, pig)
4. Business licences
Guest house licenee 24,000 25,000
(a) + TSh 1,000
per room if no
liquor licence; or
(b) + TSh 2,000
per room if liquor
licence
Application fee for business (a) Liquor licenee (a) 1,500 (a) 3,000
licence (b) Others (b) 1,000 (b) 1,500
5. Market fees
Per day 100 100
6. Others
Bicycle tax Annual fee 1,000 500
Fishing licenee Annual 960 1,500
Entertainment levy 20 per person 3,000 per show
Advertising board fee (a) 2,000 (a) 2,000 (for
(above 1 common
square ones), and
metre) (b) 4,000 for
(b) 1,000 advanced
(beIow 1 ones (with
sq.m.) lights etc.)
Sand fee Per lorr á 7 tons 500 1,000
Source: Information provided by the District Revenue Offces, Kibaha DC and Kilosa DC
Most rates on crops and lIvestock are specific, based on physical units. As such,
comparison between councils can only be made for simI1ar items, e,g., cess on
maize or cattle (table 2,3). Since crop cess is levied on quantity sold (per bag, per
container, etc.), and the market price varies throughout the season, the effective
tax rate as a percentage of the market price also differs for the same tax base
throughout the agricultural season, For example, using the July 1997 local market
prices the following cess rates were applied (table 2.4):
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Table 2.4. Local market rices and cess rates in Kilosa DC and Kibaha DC (Jul 1997)
Market price/1 00 kg Cess rate Effective tux rate (in
(in TSh) (in TSh) percent ofmarket price)
200
Cashew-nuts 20,000 4,000
Source: Information collected during fieldstudies in 1997
2.2.3 Tax revenues per capita
Total tax revenues per capita reveal substantial differences between councils
(table 2,5). In 1995, reported revenues per person above the age of 18 ranged from
TSh 344 in Lindi DC, to TSh 1,541 in Mbinga DC, Furthermore, we observe large
variations between areas within councI1s (table 2,6), For instance, in Kibaha DC
reported revenues per capita in 1996 in Visiga ward were TSh 199, compared to
TSh 439 in Magindu ward (tab le 2,6), We also observe varations between
villages within individual wards (see table 2.7), In 1996 tax revenues per capita in
Tumbi ward (Kibaha DC), varied from TSh 29 in Mkuza/Kibondeni villages, to
TSh 376 in Vikawe village.
Table 2,5 Tax revenues per person above the age of 18 in district councils, 1992-1995 (in TSh)
DISTRICT 1992 1993 1994 1995
Lushoto 264 253 400 544
Mwanga 432 495 518 925
Moshi DC 441 498 600 848
Meatu 874 1 030 1220
Maswa 554 380 716 838
Bariadi 385 715 880 1476
Kigoma DC 353 483 526 608
Kasulu 445 614 557 684
Kyela 385 894 589 694
Kwimba 272 341 617 1007
Mbinga 537 560 1266 1 541
Songea DC 651 816 973 1026
Mbeya DC 535 694 873 706
Chunya 492 608 944 708
Makete 790 1 153 688 703
Njombe 687 714 689 1527
Nachingwea 337 385 639 1 128
Lindi DC 136 194 289 344
Igunga 599 490 470 1 142
Nzega 437 545 479 720
Average 460 585 687 920
Number of DCs 19 20 20 20
Source: Computed from data collected from the Ministr of Local Governent in 1997, and the
National Population Census (URT, 1988)
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Table 2.6 Tax revenues in wards in Kibaha DC, 1996 (in TSh)
Ward Total tax rev. Population Tax revenues
ver cavita
Tumbi 6083562 29269 208
Visiga 2359781 11839 199
Kibaha 4415832 17674 250
M1andizi 5923870 17763 333
Ruvu and K wala 3909019 19333 202
Soga 1424545 7064 202
Magindu 3579212 8144 439
Source: District Revenue Office, Kibaha DC
Table 2. 7 Tax revenues in vilages in Kibaha DC, 1996 (in TSh)
Ward Vilage
3648
733
332
212
588
2431
237
82
39
29
97
376
Mailimoja +Mwanalugali
Pizha ya ndege + soru
Pangani
Mkuza + Kibondeni
Bokotimiza
Vikawe
Source: Ward offices, Kibaha DC
2,2.4 Revenue fluctuations
Large annual fluctuations in the revenue generation of councI1s are observed, The
trend describing fluctuations in local governent own revenues does not follow a
linear path, but is betler described by a polynomial fuction (i,e" wave-like or
undulating), However, in contrast to other studies, which argue that there is a general
dec1ining trend in the real value of local governent own revenues (e,g" Semboja
and Therkildsen, 1991 and 1992), we find no general trend. From a sample of about
50 councI1s the trend during the period 1992-95 was dec1ining for somecouncils,
whI1e it was increasing in real terms for others (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1999).
There are of course some a priori reasons for expecting real tax revenues to be
fluctuating. First, many of the local tax bases are partially based on agrcultural
output, and thus are very sensitive to unpredictable weather conditions, For example,
although many agrculture-related taxes are specific rather than ad valorem
something which limit their responsiveness to economic upswings, their yield falls
dramatically when there is a crop faI1ure due to drought or floods, This asymmetric
elasticity may even extend to those local taxes presumed to be relatively stable,
Therefore, if income is signficantly reduced either directly or indirectly because of a
drop in agrcultural production, people may be unable to pay development levy,
business licences, hotellevies, and other local taxes, Furthermore, we find
indications of revenue shortfalls in some councI1s in election years, particularly with
respect to development levy (see section 5,3.4).
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2.3 Tax administration
2,3,1 The institutional set-up for tax collection
Local governent tax collection is basically a council's staff affair.6 In district
councils it is organised around three leve!s, namely the council headquarters, the
wards and the vilage levels (see figure 2,1), At the sub-village leve!, the kitongoji
leader is responsible for mobilising taxpayers.
At the council headquarters the responsibility rests with the council treasury,
headed by the District Treasurer (DT). Here, two major groups of staff exist,
namely revenue collectors (DRC) under the revenue accountant (DRA), and
revenue inspectors (DRI) , The first is responsible for the revenues collected at the
council headquarters and the sub-district leveIs, i,e" the ward and vilage leveIs,
The second group forms the inspectorate that is the audit and investigation wing
of revenue collection, In principle, the inspectorate staff do not assess and collect
taxes, They are responsible for identifying tax evasion and frauds, they shall
facilitate enforcement and compliance of taxpayers, and enhance work discipline
and accountability of tax collectors, Partly due to the incentive structure produced
by the above institutional arrangement, lack of adequate staff and transport
facilities (especially for distant and not easily accessible areas) revenue inspectors
may actively participate in revenue collection, The example of Kilosa DC, to be
further elaborated in section 5,3,3, provides an ilustrative case,
At the ward leveIs, the responsibility for tax collection rests with the offce of the
Ward Executive Offcer (WEO), The WEO also handles developmental and law
and order functions at that level. For this purpose the local militia are to their
disposal. In larger wards which may possess greater revenue potential there will
also be a ward revenue collector (WRC) to spearhead revenue collection in the
ward.
At the village level, the responsibility rests with the offce of the vil age executive
offcer (VEO), The VEO is also responsible for vilage developmental issues, The
vilage executive officers are nominated to their position by the vil age
governents, but appointed and employed by the counciL. The system of
nomination ensures that the VEOs have to come from the villages, Many of the
present VEOs are the previous village CCM party-secretaries. At the sub-village
leve! the kitongoji leader assists in mobilising taxpayers,
The way tax collection is organised in practice may, however, vary between
councils. In Kilosa DC, for instance, the village leve! has been exc1uded from
collection, and collection has been taken over by the ward level. According to the
distrct treasur staff, this was due to incentive problems connected with tax
collection at the vilage level. One problem anses from the presence of two principals
for the VEOs, i.e" the vilage governent as the nominating authonty and the council
as the appointing and employing authonty, leading to divided loyalty. Another
problem anses from VEOs operating within their areas of domicile, Lack of arm's-
length-relationship between tax collectors and taxpayers introduces economics of
affection into village tax collection. In many villages the kitongoji leaders also resist
in mobilising people to pay taxes due to the unpopularity of taxation, In yet other
6 Local government tax administration is completely separated from the central government revenue
authority (Tanzania Revenue Authority). Appendix 4 provides a brielpresentation olthe central government
tax administration and tax structure.
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councils, Vil age Executive Officers work as free agents or as agents of the vilage
council, to collect development levy and other minor revenue sources (Price
Waterhouse, 1998a). In Lindi De, for instance, the council gives a commission of20
percent of the total revenue collected to the VEOs. This is meant as an incentive to
the revenue collectors, as the more revenue they collect the higher the commission,7
Figure 2.1 The institutional set-up for tax collection in district councils
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7 This incentive scheme has some parallels to "tax farming ": Businessmen (either individual or syndicates)
who wish to become state fiscal agents submit competitive bids to the government (council) specifing how
much they are wiling to pay for the privilege of collecting taxes. In principle, the highest bidder is to win the
council 's choice. Tax larming was widespread during the Athenian and Roman Republics and in medieval
Europe. Historical evidence indicates that tax larming often led to extortion ol taxpayers' initiating tax riots
(W ebber and Wildavsky, 1986). Proponents of the system today argue that it minimises administrative costs
and results in more ejfcient collection (Azabou and Nugent, 1989). Others argue that the supposed gains are
largely ilusionary because the system leads to extortion through overzealous collection. Thus, the
government would have to spend considerable resources on monitoring tax collectors (Stella, 1993). Pre-
shipment inspection companies inspecting and assessing the value ol imports to some countries, including
Tanzania, may be considered a modem version of "taxI arming H. In yet other countries, collection of customs
duties has been fully privatised. For instance in Mozambique since 1997, collection of customs has been
commissioned to the British company Crown Agents. In recent years, some councils in Uganda have
privatised the collection olmarket dues.
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2.3.2 Collection procedures
Most taxes are paid in cash. One exception is for civil servants whose development
levy is withheld from their salaries. Taxpayers should receive an authentic council
receipt for the amount oftax they pay. Voluntary payment can be made during offce
hours at any of the revenue collecting centres mentioned above, For development
levy, this period starts on January 1 up to September 30. All tax payments made after
the deadline are subject to a penalty equivalent to 50 percent of the tax rate (Fjeldstad
and Semboja, 1998), As from October 1 to December 31 development levy payment
"campaigns" are conducted, organised by the ward office and using state organs, i,e"
the local militia and judiciary, to ensure compliance, Defaulters may be visited in
their homes, or people may be required to show their tax receipts at roadblocks. Non-
compliers who are caught are brought to court at the primary court or ward leveL. Due
to widespread resistance, tax campaigns for development levy in Kilosa De (involving
the militia) start as early as in July, i,e" three months before the vo1untary (and statutory)
payment period expired, The treasury staff argued that by waiting to the end of
September, taxpayers' would have spent their money and no money would be left for
taxation,
Many people are brought to court every year for not paying development levy.
According to the WEO in Kibaha ward (Kibaha De), more than 700 people (out of a
total number oftaxpayers of3080) were called to court after a tax campaign in 1994.8
In 1996, 200 people in Mlandizi ward (Kibaha De) were brought to court after a
similar campaign, The District Treasurer confirmed that hundreds of people were
brought to court every year for not having paid the levy, However, only few people
are jailed because of non-compliance, since family members generally pay them out
before they are imprisoned,
Market fees and crop cesses are, in general, collected at the seIling points and
markets, However, "big buyers" of cessable goods (often co-operatives) are expected
to pay directly to the council treasury, The buyer then pays the council in advance
based on the strength of the figures estimated by the co-operative officer from
Ministry of Agriculture. lf the figures are not accepted by the "big buyer",
negotiations are opened. Livestock cess is collected by visiting the owners of the
animals, In particular, cattle cess has proved to be problematic to collect, partly due to
cultural reasons, In some areas it may also involve high personal risk for tax
collectors to approach pastoralists,
Roadblocks are frequently used to control taxpayers. For instance, manned barrers
are used to control buyers of certain crops like cashew nuts in the Coastal Region,
The buyer has to produce the cess receipt before he is allowed to take any cashew
nuts from the district. Similar checkpoints are used to control bicyclists with respect
to bicycle tax, We were also informed that roadblocks sometimes were used to collect
market fees, implying that the fees had to be paid even before the goods had entered
the market place, Most licences and some fees have to be paid at the respective
offices at the distrct headquarter. Licences are often issued on an annual or semi-
annual basis. The council may carry out inspections of entrepreneurs and businesses
to check that licences are paid.
2.3,3 Procedures for reporting and submitting tax revenues
The reporting and submission of the revenues collected follows the usual bureaucratic
procedure in which each leve! reports to a leve! above it. The VEO submits the
revenues to the WEO (or WRe), and the latter submits to the Distrct Treasurer (DT),
8 We do not have information on how many who actually were sent to court.
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through the revenue section, The DT or other staff members of the council treasury
subsequently submit the revenues to the bank.9 The collector receives a receipt on the
money submitted, which is to be registered and filed in the collector's books,
The money collected is delivered personally by the VEO or the WEO to the level
above, Before delivery the collected money is stored in the village or ward offices,
or in the collectors' homes, None of the village and ward offces visited in Kibaha
and Kilosa DC had any safety deposits where the money was stored. In general,
the money was kept in unlocked boxes. To reduce the risks oftheft, some councI1s
have imposed rules that specify the maximum amount of money allowed to be
stored at the village and ward offices before being transferred to the leve! above,
Similar rules apply for the district treasury, When larger amounts are to be
transferred, the police may be requested to guard the offices during night and to
guard the transfer.
The frequency of reporting and submitting cash funds varies by the levels of revenue
collected (which may vary on a seasonal basis), the distance between the lower leve!
revenue collecting centre (e,g" vilage headquarters) and the higher leve! centre (e,g.,
ward headquarters), and transport accessibility between the centres. In principle, the
VEOs and WEOs submIt revenues on a weekly basis to the levels above, while the
DT submIts revenues to the bank on a daily basis,
2.3.4 Recording revenues
In principle, revenues are recorded at all three collection points, and the books are
subject to auditing, In practice, records are of ten inaccurate and poorly organised,
Data on specific revenue-generating activities at particular collection sites are
rarely kept. In Kibaha DC, for instance, we found inconsistencies between the
revenues recorded by the village executive officers and the records at the ward
level. There were also inconsistencies between the records of the ward and district
leveIs, Furthermore, the tax register books for development levy in the villages
and wards visited were, in general, not updated, In Kibaha DC, some deceased
persons were still registered as taxpayers years after they had passed away, Some
persons who had moved from the area were still in the registers. In Chanzuru and
DumI1a wards in Kilosa DC the tax register books were not avaI1able, According
to the Ward Executive Officers, the books had either been stolen and bumt or had
just disappeared, Thus, lists of names were provided on hand-written sheets by the
WEOs (se e Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998:8),
The councI1s prepare annual accounts, The stakeholders to the final accounts are:
. The full counciL.
. The Proper Offcer (Mini stry of Local Governent).l0
. The Prime Minister' s Offce.
. The Offce of the Controller and Auditor General.
. The general public.
However, the detaI1ed system of final accounts that are supposed to be prepared at
the end of each financial year is a particular problem, Although some councI1s are
reasonably curent with these accounts, many are at least a few years b ehind ,
9 Generally, this is the local branch of the National Bank of Commerce (NBC). In rural areas only NBC
operates. In 1997, part of the NBC was privatised and renamed to NBC 1997 Ltd..
10 In the Local Government Act of February 1999 the concept ''proper offcer" is abolished (see section 4.2).
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Thus, the most recent revenue data we were able to obtain from the Ministry of
Local Governent in Dodoma in July 1997, were almost 2 years old, For some
councils only aggregate figures on tax revenues were available at the ministerial
level, 11 while data disaggregated into the major bases were available for others,
The figure for own revenues for all councils is not known by the mini stry
responsible for local governents,12 This situation reflects differences in the
routines and capacity of councils for record keeping, and also lack of routines
and/or capacity at the ministeriallevel to record the data, Furthermore, it reveals
inaccurate and disorganised financial recording in some councils,
The relatively complicated way the accounts are presented makes it often
problematic for the local councillors to review them, Price Waterhouse (1998a)
reports, for instance, that local politicians (councilors) in Moshi DC often found
the annual accounts too technical and only a few understood them, This situation
gives the council administration and treasurers the entire information powers, and
may open up for misuse of such power and council resources (see section 5.3,3).
2.3,5 Auditng
The collector is supposed to deliver a receipt of a standard form to the taxpayer, a
copy of which is retained by his superiors to be audited, The receipt books, printed
by the official government printer for the specific council are kept in the council
head-quarter's store (CHS) for distribution to the three revenue centres,13 Usually the
receipt or counterfoil-books are kept by the district revenue accountant (DRA) who,
in principle, is not participating in tax collection,14 Only revenue collectors at the
council headquarter and the ward executive officers (WEOs) can collect receipt books
from the CHS, The ward revenue collectors (WRCs) and the VEOs receive their
allocation of receipt books from the WEOs,
As a rule, a new receipt book can be issued only after the earlier one has been
returned and accounted for. The tax collector is required to return the old receipt
books showing used counterfoils and unutilised receipts for audit so as to control
their use before receiving new ones, In practice, this procedure is of ten not
followed, In Kilosa DC, for instance, we found that many employees of the
council received receipt books for a period of several years, but failed to submit
them in the council head quarters after using them in revenue collection (se e
section 5.3,3),15
11 These included, for instance, Kigoma and Mtwara Urban Councils, Bunda DC, Masasi DC, Sengerema
DC and Magu De.12 According to the Commissioner of Local Government (Ministry of Regional Administration and Local
Government), such data did not exist (mid-March 1999). The only data he was able to provide for recent
years were data from individual councils. Offcials from the Ministry of Finance confirmed that aggregate
data on loeal government own revenues were not available.
13 There are five main types of receipt books; each assigned to specifc taxes. All except ane are named by the
specifc type of tax they are earmarked to collect. They are:(I) development levy (containing 150
receipts/leaves); (2) market fees (IOO leaves); (3) loeal brew (IOO leaves);(4) Universal Primary Education
(UPE, 100 leaves); and (4) "other taxes" (HW5, 50Ieaves).14 In practice, however, we have observed cases where the DRA also functions as a revenue collector (see
section 5.3.3).
15 The Commission on Corruption (URT, 1996a:318) also reports that government receipt books are not
being returned. The Commission compares the present unsatisfactory situation with previous practises and
states: "Under the old tax collection system, every collector was given receipt books and was required to
return them at the end of every month showing used counterfoils and unutilsed receipts for audit so as to
control their use. "
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In principle, financial control in local authorities is exercised through internal and
extemal auditing, Intemally, the revenue department of the council is responsible
for the "daily" accounting work, inc1uding control.16 According to Semboja
(1995:13), the audit section in Kilosa DC had not been established, However,
through a regional arrangement, councils in the Morogoro-region shared an
internal auditor who was stationed in Morogoro Municipal council, but he had not
been in K.ilosa "since the beginning of the year (1995) due to poor health". By
July 1997, internal auditing was still not carred out in Kilosa DC, This was also
the case in Kibaha DC, according to the District Treasurer. Price Waterhouse
(1998a) reports that the Masasi DC has no internal audit deparment; "however,
the Treasurer realises the need for one" it is stated in the report, Although the
efficiency and effectiveness of monitoring and audi ting devices may vary between
councils, the cases referred to above probably reflect the situation in many
councils,
Extemal audit is to be done by the Office of the Controller and Auditor General.
The Auditor General is to send auditors to verify the accounts, cashbooks and
ledgers, Audit queries arise from this exercise, However, the Auditor General's
office is, in general, understaffed and has limited capacity to undertake
comprehensive audits in all councils because of severe shortage of qualified and
trained staff, especially at the senior professionallevels. According to Sedigh and
Muganda (1999:167), the Auditor General's Office has been hindered by financial
constraints and its inability to attract, train or keep suitable staff since the private
sector is offering more rewarding employment to professionals. In spite of these
constraints, the number of councils whose accounts have been audited has risen
recently. The audits show that financial performance of many councils is poor,
and an increasingly number of cases has been reported in recent years where the
Auditor General is not approving the councils' accounts (see section 5,3.3 and
appendix 2), Price Waterhouse (1998a) reports that between 1993 and 1996, out
of 64 councils audited, the accounts of 33 councils (52 percent) were c1assified as
poor, 12 as average and 19 as good,
2,3,6 Budgeting
An examInation of budgeted versus actual figues for several years in Kibaha and
Kilosa DC, indicates that these two sets of figues bear little resemblance to each
other.17 Budget estimates often overstate revenues and sometimes understate
expenditures. Some councils may also manufactue a budget reflecting a surplus to
gain Ministr approval.18
Figure 2,2 ilustrates the gap between budgeted revenues and what was actually
reported to the district treasury in Kilosa DC in the period 1992-96, In 1993, for
instance, the budget was about 100 percent higher than the revenues actually
reported, and for 1996 about 50 percent above the reported revenues,
16 It should be noted that provision for internal audit does not substitute for revenue audit and investigation.
The two have distinet functions.
17 Smoke (1994:83) reports similar cases from local authorities in Kenya.
18 Ingle (1972:254), referring to local authorities in Tanzania, argues that "rpjolitical systems under
pressure from the center to produce solid development results were likely to exercise their own form of
accommodation. The most common form of accommodation to date had been simply to pass false or injlated
accounts of development results to superiors who were out of touch with local conditions ".
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The differences between budgets and reported revenues become even more
outspoken if we look at specific revenue bases, The collection ratio for
development levy for Kibaha DC in 1996 was 26,7 per cent, measured as the ratio
between actually reported and projected revenues based on population statistics,
The corresponding figure for Kilosa DC was 45.6 per cent (Fjeldstad and
Semboja, 1998),19 Furthermore, we observed large differences in the collection
ratio between areas within the same counciL. For instance, in 1996 the ratio
between reported and budgeted levy in wards in Kibaha DC varied from 8,9 per
cent to 38.7 percent. The corresponding figures for Kilosa DC were 13 per cent
and 97 percent, respectively,
Figure 2.2 The gap between budgeted and actually reported revenues, Kilosa De
Estimated and actual tax revenues, Kilosa De (1992-96)
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The gap between the budget and what actually is reported may have several
explanations. First, the estimates may be umealistically high, Several studies
show that the budgeting process in many councils are not based on realistic
knowledge about the potential (see, e,g" Semboja and Therkildsen, 1989:43), For
instance, with respect to agricultural cess, the financial planners seem to be
unaware of the tax base in the districts, Price Waterhouse (1998a) reports, for
instance, from Lindi DC that to "estimate the annual revenue from cashew nut
cess for any given year the council simply adds 10 % of the previous years
revenue", There are also cases where plans are revised upwards or downwards
following good or bad performances in only one year. In Moshi DC, for instance,
the planners take into consideration the previous year's trend and the prevailing
19Projected revenue is estimated as taxable population in the council multiplied with the levy rate.
16
weather conditions (Price Waterhouse, 1998a), According to some observers,
revenue targets are based on the expenditure budgets that again are based on what
the planners and councillors "want to do", Priorities based on resource constraints
are not made in the expenditure budgets, implying that revenue targets, in general,
are umealistically high, Thus, in many local authorities the process of preparing
budget estimates is not a very meaningful exercise,
It should, however, be added that produce cess, in p articular, is an uncertain
revenue base since agricultural output in Tanzania is very sensitive to
unpredictable weather, This makes produce cess an uncertain source of revenue,
something that renders financial planning diffcult (Semboja and Therkildsen,
1989:43), Data on business licences also reveals lack of sufficient knowledge on
the part of districts of the revenue potential of this source, Semboja and
Therkildsen (1989:44) states that significant deviations between planned and
actual revenue from this source is an indication of lack of criteria in arrving at
these targets, One problem adding to this is the fact that most owners of
business es in district councils hardly keep any accounts, and often household and
business accounts are not separated. If accounts are kept several books may be in
use for different purposes, inc1uding one for tax purposes showing deficits,20 Non-
compliance further complicates the budgeting process, In particular, tax resistance
is extensive for development levy (see Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998), Corrption
adds to the problem of proper budgeting (see section 5.3.3),
2.4 Summary
The local governent revenue strcture in Tanzania is extremely complicated and
non-transparent. A large number of revenue. bases, sub-bases and tax rates exist.
Moreover, large varations exist among councils with respect to the number of
revenue sources and rates. Revenues per capita var signficantly between councils
indicating both differences in tax potential and differences in the effectiveness of the
local tax administrations, No c1ear pattem can be discemed from this strcture, Thus,
in practice, a local governent revenue structure for Tanzania does not exist. This
is because each council has its own tax structure, implying that there are more
than 110 local governent revenue structures in the country (exc1uding vil age
councils),21 Furthermore, reporting, budgeting and auditing practises are weak in
the councils studied. This characterises all leveIs, from the village to the Ministry.
20 According to an offcial in Tanzania Revenue Authority, some companies keep four diferent books: Onefor
the tax purposes showing deficits; one for the shareholders showing balance; one for potential investors,
including donors, showing profitable results; and one showing the correct figuresfor internal use only.21 In October 1998, there were III local authorities in Tanzania: 92 District Councils; 9 Town Councils; 9
Municipal Councils; and L City Council (Dar es Salaam). However, the number of councils is increasing.
Due to attempts to equalise rates on some revenue bases among councils within the same region, some rates
have tended to difer by regions.
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3 Qualitative characteristics of the local
government revenue system
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we briefly review the qualitative characteristics of some major
local revenue bases, The basic principles or desirable characteristics of a revenue
system are presented in section 3,2,
3.2 Principles of taxation
There are several general criteria against which any local revenue scheme might
be judged (Bird, 1992; Bahl et aL., 1990; Groenewegen, 1990; and Devas, 1988),
These inc1ude the ability to raise revenues, effects on economic efficiency or
neutrality, equity implications and administrative feasibility:
1, Mobilsing resources: The main objective of taxation is to raise enough
resources to fund public expenditures, Thus, the adequacy of a tax should be
considered in relation to the functions that it is supposed to finance.22 Revenue
adequacy, depends on the levels of the rate and base, For instance, high rates
will most likely produce excess burdens through reactions in behaviour by
taxpayers attempting to avoid or evade the tax, Furthermore, the stability and
predictability of the tax yield has to do with the elasticity of the revenue
source,23 Thus, as the resource needs of a local authority increase due to
population growth, increased service demands, inflation, etc" a good revenue
source will respond in the same manner. The ratio of tax yield in relation to
collection costs is also relevant in this context.
2. Economic effciency: Taxation nearly always affects some economic choice,
However, a tax should be designed in such a way to minimise (or avoid)
distorting consumer and producer choices or discouraging work or savings. To
the extent that local taxes, licences and charges alter choices that otherwise
would have been made, they are economically inefficient. Exemptions to this
rule are taxes whose purose are to discourage certain types of consumption
(e,g" cigarettes and a1cohol) and production (e. g., environmentally damaging
industries), In such cases, taxes can be used to internalise negative external
effects of such activities,
3, Equity: The tax ought to be fair in its relative treatment of different
individuals, First, it should be horizontal equitable implying that the burden of
taxation should be similar between different groups with similar economic
positions, Second, it should be vertically equitable, which implies that those
with greater economic resources should contribute more than those with less
resources, Finally, it should be geographically equitable, in that there should
22 The first systematic study of the functions and objectives of taxation was made by Adam Smith (I776) in his
'1nquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations" Smith emphasised the requirement that taxes
must generate enough revenues to finance essential public expenditures. He then proposed four "canons" or
guiding principles of taxation, usually referred to as the principles of (I) equity; (2) certainty on behalf of
taxpayers (i.e.,freedomfrom arbitrary levies); (3) convenience ofpayments; and (4) economy in collection.
The fourth canon includes the aspects of effciency costs, administrative costs, compliance costs for taxpayers
and incentives for smuggling and tax evasion. Modem tax theory in essence repeats Adam Smith 's focus on
revenue adequacy, equity, effciency, certainty, and cost-effective tax administration (Musgrave and
Musgrave, 1989; and Stiglitz, 1988).
23 The term elasticity is here referring to the percentage increase in revenues associated with each 1 percent
increase in local income.
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not be substantial, arbitrary differences in tax burden between councils, unless
these represent differences in service provision,
4. Administrative feasibility: A tax should be capable of being implemented in
terms of political, cultural, institutional, technological and economic
constraints, Efforts to improve local revenue mobilisation must recognise the
current environment in which the local governent operates, Furhermore, a
tax should not place undue strains on limited administrative capacity, This
implies that it ought to be relatively easy and inexpensive to administer.
In the literature, three more criteria are sometimes added. First, is the criterion on
certainty on behalf oftaxpayers (Stiglitz, 1988). This implies that a tax should be
designed in such away that individuals can ascertain what they are paying. Thus,
the political system can more accurately reflect the preferences of individuals (i,e"
political responsibility) , Transparency and accountability are incorporated into
this criterion. Second, is the criterion on suitabilty as a local government revenue
source (Devas, 1988). This criterion requires that it should be clear to which local
authority a tax payment should be made, The tax should not be easily avoided by
moving the tax object from one council to another. Finally, is the criterion related
to macroeconomic stabilisation, Stabilisation is commonly associated with short-
term fiscal policy and its primary responsibility usually assigned to the central
24governent.
On a general leve!, the degree of decentralised spending and revenue generation
responsibilities may have significant implications for the central governents
ability to conduct macroeconomic polices through the budget (Ter-Minassian,
1999:56), Changes in economic circumstances may require counter-cyclical
policy changes in tax rates and bases, as well as in public expenditures, Thus, a
loss of major tax instruments or of controlover a large share of public
expenditures can severely constrain the centre's room for manoeuvre, for instance
in raising taxes or cutting spending to curb overheated domestic demand, The
relevance of this last criterion may be questioned with respect to local governent
taxation in most developing countries, since taxes raised by local authorities often
represent only a minor fraction of total tax revenues, However, the mo ve towards
substantial expenditure decentralisation in some countries may constrain the
central governents ability to pursue stabilisation policy, Promoting fiscal
responsibility at the sub-national leve! therefore calls for implementation of a
stable and transparent system oftransfers from the central to the local governent
leve! (see section 6.4). Thus, it is important to consider the consistency (or
possible inconsistencies) between local governents' policies and the
macroeconomic objectives of the central governent.
No local tax wil, of course, score well on all these criteria, Most like ly, local
taxes score less well on these criteria than do national taxes, since central
governents usually and for good reasons take the most revenue productive taxes
for the national leve1.25 Nevertheless, these criteria do provide auseful way of
evaluating existing (and proposed) local taxes,
24 The term fiscal policy normally applies to the use of fiscal instruments (i.e., public revenues and
expenditures) to influence the working of the economic system in order to maximise economic welfare of the
society. Stabilisation and fiscal policy are often used as synonyms.25 In particular, effciency and administrative considerations argue for the centre to keep the major taxes,
especially the corporate income tax, multistage income taxes such as VAr, and taxes onforeign trade.
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3.3 Evaluating local revenue bases
In this section we briefly review some major revenue bases according to the
criteria outlined above. It is not our intention to carr out a detailed and rigorous
evaluation, but to get some indications on the suitability of the present local
governent revenue bases,
3.3,) Development levy
The poll tax, commonly referred to as "development levy, is in principle levied on
every person above the age of 18 years and ordinarily resident in the area (Tax
Commission, 1991),26 Women are exempted in many councils.z7 In most areas,
the tax is levied on a flat basis, However, in some urban areas, particularly in the
wage sector, graduated rates based on income apply, In recent years, some
councI1s have completely abandoned the tax, There is a widespread resentment
among the public against paying the tax, and non-compliance is a serious problem
(see Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998).
In principle, a flat-rate head tax is highly regressive, and, thus, not in accordance
with the vertical equity criterion, In practice, partly due to extensive evasion and
partly due to collection procedures, development levy is probably less regressive
than expected (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998). For instance, remote and less
affuent areas may not be approached by collectors, partly due to the costs of
visiting those areas, and partly because of the personal risk involved, Furthermore,
widespread tax resistance has lead tax collectors to target those taxpayers that are
able to pay and whose connections to the political and economic establishment in
the council are limited. For instance, in our survey we found that the compliance
rate of people who were migrants to the surey area from other regions in
Tanzania was higher than the compliance rate ofpeople bom in the area, Migrants
were also found to be relatively more wealthy than people bom in the area,
Roadblocks and the local militia are frequently used as instruments of tax
enforcement. Thus, collection costs are high, According to the ward executive
offcers and vilage executive offcers interviewed, a significant part of their time
was spent on collecting development levy, They also considered development
levy to be the most problematic tax to collect.
The tax collection ratio measured as the ratio between actual reported and
projected development levy varies both between and within councI1s, with
implications for horizontal and vertical equity, From a sample of 27 councils we
found that the effective development levy rate in 1995 varied from TSh 40 (Kilwa
DC) to TSh 936 (Makete DC). The ratio between actual reported levy and projected
revenue between wards in Kibaha DC in 1996, vared from 8,9 percent to 38,7
percent. The corresponding figures for Kilosa DC were 13 percent and 97 percent.
There are also large variations in tax effort between vilages in the same ward,
According to figures obtained from the ward offce in Mlandizi (Kibaha DC), only
4.5 per cent of the registered taxpayers in the rural village Disunyara had paid
development levy for 1996 by the end of November, compared to 39,1 per cent in
26A brief history of development levy, previously named "local rate ", is presented in Lee (1965), Dryden
(1968) and Bukurura (1991).
27The issue ofwomen paying the levy has been controversial (Tripp, 1997:157). Supporters of 
the levy on
women argue that women are equal to men according to the law and thus can own their own property.
Opponents argue that women in rural areas rarely own their own property and therefore should be exempted.
In particular, the development levy has revealed a conflict between upper- and lower-income women.
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the rural-urban village Mlandizi B.. We were not able to confirm these figures by
the village executive offcer (VEO) , However, in some wards we found that the
revenues reported by the VEOs were higher than those reported by the ward
executive offcers.
For formal sector employees the levy is withheld from their salaries, Development
levy should be considered an extra income tax levied on the top of the income tax
payable to the central governent. In theory, a head tax has no impacts on
resource allocation, However, due to resistance, many people put much effort into
evading the tax, for instance, by hiding in the bush during tax campaigns, Thus,
the tax distorts taxpayers' behaviour and may also have negative impacts on
production,
3,3,2 Produce cess
Produce cess is levied by district councI1s on the sale of major crops such as
maize, rice, coffee, tea, cotton, cashew nuts, sisal, oil-seeds, sweet-potatoes, etc"
and on livestock.28 Since produce cess is levied on physical units (weight or
volume) rather than value, this makes the source ine1astic unless adjustments
become frequent enough to catch up with inflation, Besides, the revenue generated
is dependent on offcially marketed output, as the base is readily not known,
In 1987, the Minister for Local Governent directed that crop cesses should be
uniform throughout the country and should be paid by the buyer (Tax
Commission, 1991:293), The ministry's intention was that the incidence of the tax
shouldnot fall on the producer, and thereby discourage production, Furthermore,
the cess rates should be charged on the basis of volume or weight rather than crop
value (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1989:40), By levying the tax on the crop buyers
it was assumed that this would not discourage producers, We have not managed to
trace the actual tax incidence. However, according to maize and cashew nut
buyers (i,e" the taxpayers) interviewed, the cess was passed on to the producers
through lower prices,
Tax incidence most likely varies between different crops, For instance, in the
short run we would expect that cashew nuts (which is a tree crop) is relatively
inelastic in supply compared to tomatoes. Therefore, lower producer prices on
tomatoes may lead to a switch to higher priced altematives, Lower prices on
cashew nuts may in the short run not imply a switch to other crops but most likely
less inputs of fertI1i s er, pesticides, etc" which will have negative impacts on
produced volume in the longer run, Thus, by imposing high local cesses on export
products, for instance, on cashew nuts, local taxes are inconsistent with the central
governents policy to encourage export production. This is the case in Kibaha DC
where the cess rate on cashew nuts in 1997 represented 20 percent ofthe price paid
to producers, creating disincentives for producers,
The effective cess rates vary significantly between councI1s due to variations in
market prices between geographical areas, and due to seasonal variations, The
cess rates also vary between crops distorting the behaviour of pro ducers (see table
2.4), Therefore, producers living in councI1s with high taxes, transport and sell
28 For instance, in Kibaha DC the cessfor pineapples in 1997 was TSh 5 per pineapple sold, TSh ioa per bag
(tenga, i.e., 30-50 kg) oftomatoes, and TSh 200 per bag (à ioa kg) ofmaize and rice Produce cess in Kilosa
DC also includes charcoal cess ofTSh 300 per sack sold,firewood cess ofTSh 200 per bundle, andfishfee of
TSh 300-500 per container (tenga).
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their products in "low tax councI1s" where they can obtain higher after tax prices,
or to neighbouring councils that do not levy the cess, For instance, cashew nut
producers in Kibaha DC prefer to sell their produce in Dar es Salaam where prices
are higher since no cess is imposed there. In border areas, smuggling has become
extensive due to relatively high cess rates on some crops, for instance on tea and
coffee, Thus, the peasants dodge and manoeuvre to avoid the deprivation inflcted
upon them by public policy, However, such manoeuvres by the peasantry to
manipulate the market to minimise their losses are neither voluntary nor an
optimal alternative, As Bates (1981:87) comments: "The faet is that peasants
avoid the state by taking refuge in alternatives that are clearly second best, They
move out of the production of the crops that are most profitable and into activites
that have become more profitable only because they are less heavily taxed, In thus
changing the way they employ their resources, they incur economic losses, "
Furthermore, varations in taxes and rates increase horizontal inequity between
councils, Equity within councils also suffers since tax rates vary by tax Item (or
crop), and some items (crops) can only be found in specific areas, Opportnities to
evade taxes also differ by individuals and areas, SimI1arly, livestock cess is often
difficult to collect. In Kilosa DC, for instance, it has been almost impossible to
collect livestock cess from pastoralists,
3,3.3 Business licences
Business licences are, in general, charged on the basis of the type of business
undertaken, 29 Thus, two retail shops pay the same fee regardless of differences in
their sizes and turnover (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1989:44), Being based on
physical characteristics, the yield is quite inelastic in the short run (see table 3.2),
In principle, such taxes are attractive as a local revenue base, as they provide
means for local governent to tap the economic base of its area, However, they
present a number of serious problems, First, is the conflct or duplication with
national taxes creating disincentives for the business sector, Second, in terms of
economic efficiency, such a tax is likely to have a negative effect on production
and enterprise, and discriminates against service enterprises and manufacturing
industries, Third, equity effects are uncertain, but there is generally a "regressive"
tariff structure in that smaller enterprises pay relatively more, However, such
equity and efficiency effects are likely to be small (not necessarly marginal),
Finally, the tax benefits mainly larger urban centres,
29 Under the Business Licences Act no. 25 011972, all traders and prolessionals need a business licence
every year as a pre-condition to trading (Tax Commission, 1991:293). The Minister lor Trade has power,
under the Act, to appoint any authority to issue licences in respect ol any categories ol business. Since 1987,
the issue ol licences has been divided between three authorities: (1) The Ministry ol Trade, regarding
businesses ol a national or international character; (2) Regional trade offcers regarding co-operatives,
wholesale and manulacturing business, and bu ilding contractors; and (3) Local authorities regarding (i)
retail business, (ii) insurance agents, (iii) hotels, restaurants, guest houses and tea rooms, (iv) auctioneers, (v)
electrical contractors, (vi) itinerant traders, and (vii) other business not covered under businesses licensed by
the central government.
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Table 3.2 Business licences in Kibaha and Kilosa DC (1997)
Type of business Rate per annum, Kilosa Rate per annum, Kibaha
DC (in TSh) DC (in TSh)
Retail shop 18,000 10,000-40,000
Grocery 60,000
Who1esa1e 30,000
Kiosks 15,000
Restaurant 24,000 25,000
Liqueur bar 64,000
Petrol station 50,000 50,000
Guest houses 24,000 25,000 + 1,000 perroom if
no liquor licence (or +2,000
ifliqueur licenee )
Butcheries 25,000
Grinding mils 20,000 10,000-40,000
Second hand clothes 15,000
Others 6,000
Source: District Revenue Offices, Kibaha DC and Kilos a DC
3,3.4 Marketfees
Market fe es are of ten levied on a daily basis on people selling their goods at
market places, In Kibaha and Kilosa the market fee at the ordinar markets is TSh
100 per trader per day (see table 2,3), At the weekend-market, however, the rate in
Kibaha DC is TSh 200 per day, Kilosa DC has also a street-vending fee set to TSh
100 per day, There are also fees for selling goods and food in auction places,
These rates vary dep ending on the type of good, In Kilosa DC these fees range
between TSh 200 and TSh 600 per day,
The administrative costs of collecting these taxes are in general high, Taxpayers
consider them to be nuisance taxes, and compliance costs are relatively high. In
some areas the council has set up market stalIs, In these areas, a market fee is
comparable to a user charge, However, in many areas no services are provided at
the market places, Thus, market fees should be considered equivalent to a local
producer tax, Since the fees are relatively higher per unit for small scale traders,
vertical equity suffers.
3,3,5 Property and land taxes
In principle, the central governent should tax more mobile resources, while local
governents (generally) should tax more immobile resources such as property
tax, This is one of the main arguments for local property taxes, and probably also
one of the main reasons why some consultants involved in the ongoing
decentralisation reform in Tanzania argue in favour of the property tax (see
section 6,2,2),30 However, land and property taxes have rarely been effective for
political and administrative reasons in developing countries (Tanzi, 1999:48),31 In
his semInal book on land taxation, Richard Bird (1974:223) argues; "!Tjhe
administrative constraint on effective land tax administration is so severe in most
developing countries today that virtually all the more refined fiscal devises
30 In same Western countries, including Denmark and Norway, local property taxation is a good source of
local taxation. In Denmark, for instance, property taxes are levied on land values (Lotz, 1997: 188). The rate
for a given municipality is the same for all types of property, and assessments of property are adjusted
annually. Furthermore, the same rate applies to households and to enterprises. There are also rules to reduce
the tax for elderly people.31 Strasma et al. (1987) provides a careful documentation of the difculties inherent in the effective
administration of the land tax.
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beloved by theorists can and should be discardedior this reason alone, Not only
wil they not be well administered; they wil in all likelihood be so poorly
administered as to produce neither equity, effciency, nor revenue, " Furthermore,
Bennett (1990:21) argues that the widespread use of property tax as a local
revenue source is "unsatislactory in terms ol much theory", For instance, property
and land taxes are of ten regressive; they are distortionary on one factor input for
business and one form of consumption for households; it is often difficult to
maintain assessments; and they have of ten perverse effects on land markets,
According to the staff at the district revenue offces in Kibaha and Kilosa,
property and land taxes are among the most problematic taxes to collect. An extra
constraint arises in many local authorities because much land is unsureyed and
ungraded, In addition, absent landlords add to the admnistrative problems of tax
enforeement.
Historical evidence from Tanana also reports on serious problems related to
valuation of property subject to the site rate and collection of the urban house
taxes,32 According to Lee (1965:45), the problems related to the urban sile rate had
arsen "because of shortage of staff, which at one point fell to a low of one
professional valuing all urban property in the nation", creating long delays in the
assessment of propert value. However, few councils experienced problems in
collecting the site rate, This was probably due to the fact that the site rate was levied
only on the property owned by the relatively well-to-do. Lee adds that it may also
reflect agenerally low leve! of valuation compared to actual market value. In
contrast, the urban house tax faced severe problems of collection, According to both
tax officials and The Association of Local Authorities in Tanganyika there were
problems in collecting this tax,33 Landlords were c1aiming they could not afford to
pay, and the difficulties of passing some of the tax to tenants were considered to be
the major obstac1es, Furthermore, propert owners in Dar es Salaam complained
about double taxation when they had to pay land rent to the central governent and
urban house tax to the city council (Lee, 1965:47-50),
3.3,6 Hotellevy
In Kilosa and Kibaha DC the guesthouse levy in 1997 was 20 percent of tumover.
In addition, TSh 20 was levied per bed occupied in Kibaha DC (tab le 2,3), The tax
is, in principle, based on self-assessments implying incentives to underreport, The
high rates encourage evas ion, for instanee through double-bookkeeping,34 In
practice, however, since most of the smaller establishments do not issue receipts
tumover has to be estimated, Thus, for the bulk of establishments which produce
no receipts there has to be a process of negotiation between collectors and
32 In the early 1960s two kinds oltaxes were levied against real property by urban councils in Tangyanika (Lee,
1965). In areas under the jurisdiction ol a town, municipal or city council, land held under government leasehold
or long-term right oloccupancy was subject to a site rate. This land included most ol the developed business and
commercial property, as well as more expensive residential and apartment dwellings. All other houses and
buildings on land held eilher under a short-term right oloccupancy or on the basis ol customary tenure were
subject to urban house tax, and this property comprised the great bulk olAfrican housing. Finally, the central
government paid to the urban councils a sum "in lieu ol sile rate" on property that il controlled. Valuations ol all
land in urban areas should in principle be conducted every five years by offcials ol the central government, while
supplementary valuations were annually prepared in the interim periods to include propert which had changed
in character. The basis lor the valuation under the law was the sum that would be paid in a voluntary sale lor a
government lease 0199 years if improvements to the land, if any, had to be made.
33 This was the predecessor olthe present Association olLocal Authorities in Tanzania (ALAT).
34 In 1996 controls organised by the District Treasurer in Kibaha De revealed that one hotel in Mlandizi
ward and three in Tumbi ward had underreported amounts equivalent TSh 1,000,000.
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taxpayers. Such direct assessments increase administrative costs, and opens up for
corrption through the negotiations, Since the levy is based on percentage of
tumover, the yield should be quite elastic,
As a local revenue source, it is quite suitable, since the tax object is c1early
located, and the point of collection will normally be the same as the point of
incidence, However, it is the larger urban centres that can derive the greatest
revenue from this tax, Several of the arguments in the disfavour of property taxes
also apply to hotellevy,
3,3.7 Bicycle tax
This is an annual tax imposed on owners ofbicyc1es. For 1997 the bicyc1e tax in
Kilosa DC was TSh 1,000. In Kibaha De the tax is TSh 500, When the bicyc1e
tax is paid a receipt in the form of a sticker to be attached to the bike is provided.
This system is comparable to the "car stickers" used as receipts for various car-
related taxes in many Western countries. In addition, a bicyc1e registration fee has
to be paid, The registration fee for bicyc1es in Kilosa DC were TSh 100 in 1997,35
The tax is fairly easy to collect, for instance by using roadblocks, This may,
however, imply high administrative costs since the local militia often is mobilised
at checkpoints. From an equity perspective the bicyc1e tax may be favourable,
since it is in general the relatively more wealthy segments of the rural population
who can afford to buy bicycles, However, the tax imposes extra costs on the
productive sectors, in particular on small scale agriculture. Bicycles are of ten the
only available (and affordable) transport equipment in rural areas, These extra
costs may, thus, have negative impacts on production,36
3,3.8 Advertising boardlees (bilboards)
Most local authorities levy a tax on advertisement signs in their area, Tax rates are
based on size and duration, but require regular revision to keep up with inflation,
Yield and growth rates have been reasonable, but collection costs can be high, The
tax presents no particular equity or efficiency problems, and is relatively easy to
implement. It may also have a certain regulatory fuction by internalising the
costs of "bilboard jungles",
3,3,9 Sandlee
Some councils levy sand fees, In Kibaha DC the fee per load of sand in 1997 was
TSh 1,000 per 7 tons and in Kilosa TSh 500, The low price on sand, inc1uding the
fee, and increasing demand for sand for building puroses, has resulted in
extensive problems of erosion in some areas in recent years. Sand fees could have
been used to regulate sand-mining by internalising the environmental costs in the
price of sand, However, at present the low fee plays no regulatory role
3.3.10 Abattoir lee
Many councils build and operate marketplaces, and many also provide livestock
slaughter facilities and bus parks as well. In 1997, the abattoir fee in Kibaha DC
was TSh 200 per animal slaughtered, In Kilosa DC the fee was TSh 200 per cow
and bull, and TSh 20 per goat slaughtered.
35 In 1997, the estimated num ber of bicycles in the Kilosa De was 13,718.36 From an economic effciency point of view, the government should probably encourage people to buy
bicycles, instead of imposing restrictions through the tax system.
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The overallIevel and growth of yield has been reasonable. However, with rates
fixed in shilling, regular revisions are required to keep up with inflation,
Collection costs should be fairly low, since the fee is generally collected along
with charges for the use of local governents' own abattoirs, where much of the
slaughtering is done, On economic efficiency grounds it could be argued that it
discourages meat production, and encourages unoffcial and probably sub-
standard slaughtering. Otherwise this tax presents few problems of
implementation, and is generally suitable as a local tax, although large variations
in tariffs between councils could cause shifts in the location of slaughtering,
3,3,11 Other taxes, licences, charges and fees
In line with the reduced importance of development levy, in particular after
women were exempted in 1992, local authorities have searched for alternative
revenue sources. This has led to a wide range of different taxes, licences, charges
and fees, which we here refer to as "other taxes", For instance, many councI1s
operate with a large number of different licence fees varying with the types of
economic activity (see table 2,1).37
Some licences such as dog tax and the licence on the sale of alcohol, can be seen
as having a regulatory fuction, However, the regulations imposed by local
authorities are, in general, ineffective, Furthermore, the requirement for numerous
permits creates obstac1es in the path of economic development, and provides
scope for corrption, thereby ensuring that the intended purpose of regulation is
not achieved. Some of these licences, charges and fees overlap with the taxes for
which a separate charge is made, as in the case of the sale of alcohol. Apart from
yielding very little, many of these other taxes, charges and licences cost more to
collect than they yield, if all the costs are accounted for. There are often problems
of assessment and enforcement, whI1e the effects in terms of equity and effciency
are frequently unsatisfactory, Much of the burden is falling on low-income
producers, discouraging local production, encouraging smuggling etc,. 38
3.4 Summary
Many local taxes perform poorly with respect to the basic principles of taxation
outlined in section 3,2, However, these issues do not appear to be recognised by
most local governents, whose main concem simply seems to be to increase local
37 Licenses andfees in Kibaha and Kilosa (1997):
hunting licences (in Kilosa DC the rates vary depending on type of animal, while there is a flat rate in
Kilosa DC ofTSh 10,000),
fishing licence (TSh 1500 in Kibaha DC, TSh 960 in Kilosa DC),
caule auctionfee in Kilosa is TSh 200 per cow and bull, and TSh 50 per goat sold,
licence for sellng bu ilding poles (TSh 5,000 per year in Kibaha DC),
peUy trader licence (TSh 8,500 per year in Kibaha DC),
licence transfer fee (TSh 1,000 per licence in Kilosa DC if a trader changes location area or type of
business),
localliquor licence,
licence for holding a gun (TSh 500 per year in Kilosa DC, and TSh 100 in Kibaha DC),
licence to seil traditional medicine (TSh 3,500 per year in Kilosa DC),
push cart fee (in Kilosa TSh 100 per day - in addition, there is a registration fee for push carters of TSh
100 per year,
caule trekkingfee (in Kilosa DC TSh 200 per cow/bull).
38 According to Devas (1988), referring to Indonesia, such taxes have generally emerged as a result of
desperate efforts by local governments to try to find anything in their local area from which they can derive
same revenue, but most represent unsuitable forms of local taxation. Thus, it may well be that the burden of
such non-tax levies, together with the compliance costs to taxpayers and the burden ol any unofficial
payments demanded, exceeds the burdens of the local tax system itself
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tax revenues - at almost any cost. This concem has been encouraged by calls from
the central governent to local authorities to try harder to collect enough revenues
to cover the council' s wage bilL. Furthermore, the lack of co-ordination between
the local and central governent levels when imposing new taxes and licences,
has resulted in duplication of local and central governent taxes, and added to the
overall burden oftaxation (see section 4.4).
The performance of each tax with respect to the criteria outlined above is
summarised in tab le 3,3,39 We should of course be cautious by using such
"performance scales": Firstly, each criterion is given the same weight in the table,
In practice the decision-makers at the councilIevel put higher weights on revenue
mobilisation and equity considerations than the efficiency criterion (see section
4,3), Secondly, the "performance" of individual tax bases may var between
councils and also between areas within councils due to differences in natural
conditions, infrastructure and the institutional set-up of the tax administration.
Thirdly, performance may also vary between sub-bases within each major tax
base listed in the table, For instance, the impacts of produce cess most likely differ
between various crops, However, the table indicates that many local taxes - such
as those with a score of 2 or less - perform poorly,
Criteria: R
EE
E
A
Table 3.3 Review o
Scoring:
Revenue base Criteria
R EE E A Total
Deve10pment -1 -1 O -2 -4
levy
Produee cess O -l -1 O -2
Business licences 1 O O 1 2
Market fees -1 -l -l -1 -4
Propert and O -1 -1 -1 -3
land taxes
Hotellevy O -1 -l -1 -3
BicycIe tax O -1 1 O O
Advertising 1 2 2 1 6
board fees
Sand fee O 1 1 1 3
AbattoIr fee 1 O 1 1 3
39 The fable is based on a "performance sea le " suggesfed by Devas (1988).
27
4 How the current revenue system emerged
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we have described the current local governent tax
system, characterised by large variations between local authorities with respect to
revenue bases and rates, How did this revenue system emerge? In this chapter we
present three main arguments to explain the rise of the current tax system:
(1) The by-Iaws facilitate the introduction ofrevenue bases,
(2) No c1ear criteria for tax design.
(3) Lack of capacity and poor co-ordination between local governents and the
central governent with respect to tax design,
4.2 By-Iaws
At present local authorities in Tanania have a high degree of autonomy in
proposing tax by-Iaws, The Local Governent Finances Act of 1982, and
regulations made by the minister responsible for local governent specify sources
of finance and procedures for imposing and collecting taxes, In principle, every
activity located within the jurisdiction of an authority is taxable, Indeed, the Act
provides that activities can pay tax to both central governent and local
governent. Specific exemptions apply to public1y owned lands and buildings,
cemeteries and burial grounds, charitable and educational institutions and
tenements exempted by the minister for local governent by order published in
the governent gazette. Furthermore, tax liability is the responsibility of all
residents in an authority, except those proved to be completely dependent on
others for their livelihood.
In principle, proposals about new taxes and rate changes are initiated by the
Finance and Planning Committee (FPC) of the council, consisting of politically
elected councillors, In practice, however, these proposals may originate from the
council's Management Team (MT),4o The FPC forwards its recommendations to
the full Council for discussion and approval. The council' slegal section, if
available, drafts the by-Iaw to match with legal requirements and j argon,
Thereafter, the recommendations to introduce new taxes and rate changes are
forwarded to the Minister of Regional Administration and Local Governents,41
The Act requires the Minister of Local Governent to approve the proposals for
new taxes and rate changes before implementation, In practise, proposals from the
councils on tax changes seem to be rarely turne d down by the Ministry of Local
Governent.42 The most substantial impact of the Ministry's involvement is to
40 The MT consists of the District Executive Director (DED, chairman) and the heads of the departments (the
District Treasurer, the District Water Engineer, the District Engineer, the District Educational Offcer, the
District Medical Offcer, the District Land Offcer and the District Administrative Offcer).
41 In practice, such issues were until recently forwarded to the Minister through the Proper Offcer (PO). The
PO was a central government offcer with powers to oversee local government affairs. Until1998, the PO for
district councils was the Regional Commissioner (RC) and for urban councils the Minister for LG. The
Regional Local Government Offcer (RLGO) was the chief advisor of the RC on all matters of local
government. Based on the advice given by the RLGO, the RC made decisions on the councils proposals. In
the new Local Government Act ofF ebruary 1999 the concept of Proper Offcer has been abolished.42 In Kibaha DC, we were informed on one case dating a few years back where the Ministry of Local
Government did not approve a proposal to increase the development levy rate. The Ministry returned the
proposal, and requested the council to come up with a new proposal based on a lower rate.
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delay the process of approving new by-Iaws. Thus, by-Iaw approvals may not be
granted until well into the financial year in which it was expected to come into
effect.
4.3 Criteria for tax design
The Local Governent Finance Act is not explicit about the criteria to be
followed when proposing and approving new taxes and rate changes (see section
3.2). Only implicit suggestions can be read in between lines, inc1uding
considerations of ability to pay, The criterion of revenue generation can be taken
for granted to be central to local governent taxation, The LG Finance Act
specifies that rates may be based on a uniform rate per capita, a graduated rate per
capita, the value of imrovable property and an assessment on the eamings,
livelihood or possessions, Provision for graduated rates allow for ability to pay
considerations, and implicitly emphasises the issue of vertical equity,
Furthermore, the Finance Act encourages horizontal equity across local authorities
by providing that residents who choose to pay taxes in another authority should
pay the difference, ifthe rate is lower in the authority in which payment is made,
No c1ause in the Finance Act encourages local authorities to take the economic
efficiency criterion into consideration (see section 3.2), Neither does it refer to the
administrative costs implications of the tax system, However, provision for a
uniform rate per capita may implicitly be aimed to lower the administrative costs
of implementing the tax system, Furhermore, provision for consultations with and
approval from the Minister responsible for local governent may be aimed at
introducing more specialised expertise in the area of taxation to inc1ude such
considerations,
We would expect that the various decision-makers involved in tax design pursue
different criteria more rigorously than the others, Therefore, there are inherent
reasons in the local governent institutional arrangement to design a tax system
that points in many directions and are inconsistent with several of the stated
criteria, However, in practice we would expect that the decision-makers at the
council leve L emphasise the tax system's revenue generative capacity and equity
considerations (i,e" taxpayers' ability to pay), Furthermore, we would expect that
the criterion of economic effciency and the issue of securing consistency between
local and central governent policies would be major concerns of the central
leveIs, Our survey data from Kibaha and Kilosa show that both local politicians
and the staff of the management team (MT) of the council highlight revenue
generation for the provision of public services and taxpayers' ability to pay as the
major concerns when new taxes and rates are proposed, However, the
administrative staff, inc1uding tax collectors, put more emphasis on revenue
generation than councillors who emphasise the ability-to-pay criterion, Neither
cost effective tax collection nor economic efficiency seem to be of any concern,
Differences between the various stakeholders with respect to tax design seem to
be exacerbated by internal and extemal pressure that contribute to strengthen or
alter their priorities and choices (see section 5.3.4), Two examples to c1arify the
issue will suffce, First, central governent pressure on bureaucrats to raise
enough revenue to finance salaries of council staff will alter the relative
importance of the revenue criterion at the expense of other criteria, Second,
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taxpayers' pressure on councilors to lower taxes will alter the relative weight
between the ability-to-pay criterion and other criteria, Local politicians are
interested in securing their political base at allleveIs, i,e" both horizontal across
villages in the ward, and vertical from the ward leve1 to the vilage and kitongoji
leve1s, Thus, politicians most likelyare influenced by their constituents when
proposing changes in revenue bases and rates, In some councI1s this influence is
reflected in the fine-tuning of the tax structure, based on equity considerations,
The large number of sub-bases and rates observed in Kibaha De may reflect the
influence of local politicians in tax design (see section 2,2). Furthermore, this
argument implies that we may observe large variations in tax design between local
authorities dep ending on the relative power of councillors and bureaucrats,
4.4 Co-ordination between central and local government
The Finance Act requires the Minister for Local Governent to consult with the
Minister of Finance in making rules that prescribe limitations and impose
conditions on local authorities' finance legislation, However, the Minister for LG
has final authority over the issues, The reasons for incorporating top ministerial
leve1 decisions in the designing of local governent taxes are not explicitly stated
in the act. They may, however, be aimed at ensuring that inconsistencies between
local governent taxation and central governent policies are avoided. In
practise, there has until recently been little or no co-ordination between the
ministry responsible for local governent and the Ministry of Finance with
respect to taxation, 43 This has partly to do with lack of capacity at alllevels,44
Presently all the relevant decision making levels lack the required tax expertise for
designing an appropriate tax system,45 At the 10calleve1 the serious shortage of
qualified staff at the treasury and planning departments has been noted across
almost all councI1s (Semboja, 1995), Even the avaI1able staff lacks expertise on
tax issues, At the ministeriallevel, experience shows that the main concems with
respect to local tax design are raised by the Legal Department; the mini stry has no
tax experts,46 However, even ifit contained any they would easI1y be over-flooded
by influx of proposals from more than 100 councI1s,
The lack of appropriate and adequate capacity at the relevant levels may lead to:
. misinterpretation of the statutes, guidelines and policies;
. unavaI1ability of the relevant information to compute the necessary variables;
. mi suse of the relevant information; and
. simply the lack of appreciation for the importance of information, including
the above mentioned criteria for tax design,
43 In January 1999, a "Task Force on Rationalisation of Central and Local Government Taxation" was
established. The Task Force presented its preliminary recommendations to the Government in March 1999.
44 The administrative structures of the central and local governments are presented in appendix 3.45 The necessary skils are knowledge to read, understand and interpret the tax statutes and central
government guidelines, regulations and policy directions; availability of the relevant information for
estimating accurately the budgetary requirements (both revenues and expenditures), tax bases and rates.
They require substantial human resources such as statisticians, tax experts, including accountants, auditors,
lawyers, etc..
46 One recommendation made by the "Task Force on Rationalisation of Central and Local Government
Taxation" is to establish a tax unit within the Ministry for Regional Administration and Local Government
since the Ministry at present does not possess such expertise (March 1999).
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Furthermore, the weak capacity that exists in both the councils (as proposers ) and
the mInistr responsible for local governents (as the approving authority), have led
to duplication oftaxes,47 In other cases local governent taxes are inconsistent with
the central governents policy, The case of cashew cess in Kibaha DC is an
ilustrative example ofthis (see section 3,3.2),
In short, the lack of technical staff at the various decision making levels raises
serious concems about the capacity of councI1s to design tax systems that comply
with the stated criteria (section 3,2). The lack of expertise is a historical fact. The
re-introduction of local governent in 1984 after 12 years of absence did not
bring with it its old resources, expertise, culture and credibility. Even the local
governent institute at Morogoro, the Institute of Development Management, had
changed its curricula to cater for a different c1ient. Thus, the present local
governent institutional arrangement operates as if tax design is anybody' s
business.
4.5 Summary
The by-Iaw system gives local authorities in Tanzania quite a wide discretion to
introduce new local taxes and to set tax rates, subj ect to ministerial approval. Due
to lack of capacity and poor co-ordination between the central and local
governent only limited restrictions are in practice imposed by the central leve!
on local governents ' tax design, Therefore, the local revenue systems have
developed without much interference from the centralleveL. This has led to large
variations in the tax strctures of local authorities (see chapter 2), Furthermore,
lack of co-ordination between the central and locallevels has led to duplication of
taxes and inconsistencies between taxes imposed by local authorities and the
national governents priorities, for instance export promotion,
The stakeholders involved in local tax design reinforce the variations observed
between councI1s, In particular, the emphasis by local politicians on equity
considerations has led to a fine-tuning of the tax structure in councI1s where
politicians have the power to influence tax design, Thus, we argue, the present
local revenue structure are partly a result of the different interests of the
stakeholders involved in tax design, and partlya consequence of the councI1s' and
the ministry' s inabI1ity to understand the financial, economic and socIal
implications of the local tax system,
There are notable differences between the institutional arrangements of local
governent tax collection and tax design, However, in practice, the demarcations
between the instItutional environment of the two distinet activities are not as c1ear as
they might appear above (see table 4,1).
47 Some observers argue that the central and local governments are competing for the right to exploit limited
revenue sources. This might sometimes be the case. However, our findings indicate that poor co-ordination
between the diferent layers of government instead of competition leads to double-taxation of the same
revenue base. Increasing awareness of the problem of duplication by various stakeholders, including the
business community, may, however, change this situation and lead to more competition.
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erent stakeholders in tax desi n and collection
De ree o involvement in
Tax desi n Tax collection
Direct and significant Direct and si ificant
Indirect, in general, insignificant Direct and significant
Table 4.1 The role o
Agents
4.Local government politicians
5. Central government politicians
6.Donors (see section 5.3.4)
Direct, in general, insignificant Indirect, in some cases
si ificant
Direct, sometimes significant Indirect (mobilisation),
sometimes significant
Indirect, insignificant Indirect, sometimes
si ifi cant
Indirect, insignificant Indirect, sometimes
si ificant
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5 The gap between the statutory and the effective
revenue system
5.1 Introduction
Revenue collection faces two major administrative problems, First, the
administrative costs of revenue collection relative to reported revenues are high,
Second, many councils are unable to realIse fully (sometimes only a small share)
of the revenues due to them, In this chapter we will explore these two issues, and
provide possible explanations,
5.2 Administrative costs
One consequence of the present local revenue system is the high costs of tax
administration.48 The many sub-bases with different rate strctures add to these
costs. This seems, however, to be largely unecognised by local authorities. There is
little appreciation of the opportnity costs of the staff already employed by the
counciL. One might even argue that for certain small taxes and charges the collection
costs are the reason for the levy, In other words, the purpose is to create employment
or at least an income-eaming opportty for someone who rnght altematively be
unemployed, Furhermore, the way in which budgets are compiled, whereby tax
revenues appear under one heading and the costs of the local revenue office under
another, does not encourage cost-effectiveness,49 In addition, many costs are simply
not made explIcit, for instance the use of governent owned buildings, or the use of
co-operative offcers to collect certain taxes, and the use ofkitongoji-Ieaders in some
villages to mobilise taxpayers,
An illustrative example of this lack of concern for administrative costs is the
poultry produce cess in Kibaha DC. According to the proposed by-Iaw from 1990,
a cess ofTSh 2,- was to be levied on the sale of day old chicks:
"The cess shall become due and payab1e by the seIler to the council to the revenue
collector duly authorised to receive the cess for and on behalf of the counci1." ( ....)
"Any livestock owner who contravenes or fails to comply with any of the provisions
of these by-laws shall be guilty of an offenee and shall be liable to a fine not
exceeding five thousand shilings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three
months or to both such fine and imprisonment' .
It is of course quite unrealIstic to enforce a tax on chickens without substantial
resources,
The total wage bil for the tax adminstration and revenues reported in Kilosa DC is
illustrated in figue 5,1, The wage bill represented about 80 percent of total own
revenues reported in 1995,50 The corresponding figure for 1996 was about 64
percent. However, when disaggregating the figures to the ward leve!, we rind large
48 In comparison, the administrative costs of the central government "Tanzania Revenue Authority"
constitute approximately 3 percent of gross revenues reported (TRA, 1998).
49 Similar arguments are put forward by Devas (1988: 78) in relation to the Indonesian local government tax
system.50 The wage bil includes wages and allowances for the staff of the revenue department and the ward offces,
including vilage executive offcers. Revenues refer to the calendar year, while the wage bil refers to the fiscal
year of the central government that runsfrom 1 July to 30 June.
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vanatl0ns between individual wards,51 In some wards in Kilosa DC, the
administrative costs are higher than the revenues remitted to the council (figure 5,3),
For instance, in Lumbiji ward the wage bill was 2,75 times higher than the revenues
collected in 1996, The corresponding figures for Mwatan and Ulaya wards were
1,92 and 1.44 times higher, respectively, In Kidodi ward the wage bil corresponded
to 18 percent of the reported revenues from the ward, In Kibaha DC we also found
large differences between the wards, In 1996 the wage bill in Magindu ward
represented about 25 percent of total revenues reported from the ward, The
corresponding figure for Ruvu ward was 70 percent (figure 5.2).
51 The figures include the salaries of Ward Executive Offcers and Vilage Executive Offcers. These offcials
are also responsible for law and order and other administrative tasks in the ward and/or vilage. However,
according to the WEOs and VEOs interviewed, they spend a considerable part of their time to organise
and/or participate in tax collection.
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Figure 5.1 Tax revenues and wage bill, Kilosa DC
Tax revenues and wage bill, Kilosa De (1995/96 and 1996/97)
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The costs of tax enforcement also var between different revenue sources. Some
revenues are relatively easy to collect because there are c1ear ways to deal with
defaulters, If, for instance, a résident does not pay water fees, it is, in principle, easy
to tu off water (although there are sometimes political obstac1es to do so),
Similarly, businesspeople that fail to pay a licence fee can be refused services or
c10sed down. Furthermore, bicyc1e tax can easily be collected at roadblocks,
although often at relatively high administrative costs, Some revenues are not even
collected directly by the counciL. For instance, civil servants and employees in
formal sector businesses pay the development levy through a withholding system,
where the employer acts as the collector, Many taxes are, however, relatively
difficult to collect. According to our interviews with tax collectors at the ward and
village levels in Kibaha DC and Kilosa DC, development levy is considered to be
the most problematic tax to collect, followed by crop cess and livestock cess, Tax
offcials at the district headquarers also ran development levy as the most
problematic tax to collect, followed by propert and land taxes.52
5.3 Problems of revenue collection
One major administrative problem for many councils is their inability to realise
fully the revenue due to them, Thus, the ratio between reported and projected
revenues differs significantly both between councils and between areas within
individual councils, From a sample of 27 councI1s, the effective development levy
rate in 1995 varied from TSh 40 (Kilwa DC) to TSh 967 (Makete DC), indicating
large variations in the effective tax enforcement. The ratio between actual
reported levy and projected revenue between wards in Kibaha DC in 1996, varied
from 8,9 percent to 38,7 percent. The corresponding figures for Kilosa DC were
13 percent and 97 percent (see section 2,3,6),
How do we explain the gap between the statutory and the effective tax system?
Several factors may contrbute in explaining this wedge, inc1uding:
(1) Poor administrative capacity to enforce the taxes,
(2) Explicit and intentional tax evasion and resistance from taxpayers.
(3) Corrption, inc1uding embezzlement ofrevenues,
(4) Political pressure on the local tax admnistration to relax on revenue collection.
(5) Negligence on the part of many governent agencies and parastatals to pay
taxes.
Furthermore, some councI1s may also manufactue their accounts and budgets to
gain Ministerial approval (see section 2.3,6), Ths may be due to central governent
pressure on local bureaucrats to raise enough revenue to finance salaries of council
staff (see section 4.3), According to Migdal (1988:253), political systems under
pressure from the centre to produce certain development results are likely to exercise
their own form of accommodation, The most common form of accommodation is
simply to pass false or inflated accounts of development results to superiors who are
out of touch with local conditions, Thus, where supervision is lax, district leaders,
inc1uding local bureaucrats, may use their budgetar discretion and the force at their
disposal for personal gain (see section 5.3.3),
52 The experiences of local government tax offcials with respect to property taxes diverge signifcantly from
the recommendations made by consultants involved in the ongoing reform process in Tanzania. Price
Waterhouse (1998), for instance, recommends the local authorites to use "more easily collectible taxes, such
as property taxes" (see section 3.3.5).
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5,3.1 Capacity
The organisational structuresand staffng for local revenue offces have been
devised in the Ministry for Local Governent, and seem to be applied without
considering differences in the size or revenue potential of the counciL. Thus, in the
councils studied, revenue officers at the district centre and some wards claimed to
be substantially understaffed, against the standard organisation chart (figure 2,1),
even though collection costs already exceeded the yield for several of their local
taxes, Lack of staff can of course be a crippling problem in rural councils where
there are not enough collectors to post them to major market centres. In such
cases, tax collectors must travel among market sites, making collection more
occasional and difficult to enforce. Lack of reliable transport may further hamper
collectors, In the councils sureyed, the capacity to enforce collection of unpaid
development levy, land rates, licence fees, etc, is low, However, the local militia
is frequently mobilised to enforce taxes, and sometimes also the police at
roadblocks, Although such measures may boost collections significantly, the
quality and regularity of such assistance vary and may be questionable in the long
term.
Given the complicated revenue system, the large number of taxes, licences,
charges and fees, and the various rates on different items, it is probably legitimate
to argue that local governents do not have adequate collection personneI, and
that a substantial strengthening of staff is needed to administer the present revenue
system, However, there are about 110 local authorities in Tanzania, each with a
different tax system. To establish adequate capacity for designing and
administering the existing revenue system in all these councils wil require more
resources than can be available in the short to medium run in Tanzania, Even the
central governent revenue authority (TRA) faces problems in recruiting
qualified accountants, assessors, investigators and collectors, Whilst there is,
undoubtedly, room for improved tax administration, attempts to squeeze
additional revenues from poorly designed taxes may have negative effects on the
economy and the society in general. Thus, the major problem may not be lack of
capacity, but the tax structure itself.
5,3,2 Resistance from taxpayers
Taxes are widely perceived to be unfair, Taxpayers see few tangible benefits in
retum for the taxes they pay,53 Virtually no development activities are undertaken
through councils' financial sponsorship and, even the existing capacities are not
producing the expected services due to lack of operation and maintenance funds
(Semboja and Therkildsen, 1995), The deterioration and in some cases non-
existence of public services raises taxpayers perceptions of exploitation from an
unequal contract with governent, and promotes tax resistance, This contributes
to undermine the legitimacy of the governent both at the local and central
leveIs, 54
T axpayers ' perception of the quality of public services in Kilosa DC and Kibaha
DC is presented in table 5.1, Dissatisfaction seems to be most widespread in
53 For instance, in our survey of taxpayers in Kibaha De, 83 percent of the respondents answered that in
their view taxes was "only partly" or "not at all" used to provide public services. The corresponding figure
for Kilosa was 88 percent (the majority, i.e., 70 percent, answered "not at all~. Taxpayers' perceptions were
supported by the tax collectors (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998).54 See Bennett (1990) for a discussion of the concept "legitimacy" in relation to public-sector management
and accountability.
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Kilosa where 75 percent of the respondents considered the quality to be bad
(compared to 66 percent in Kibaha), None of the respondents in Kilosa considered
the public services to be good (compared to 6 percent in Kibaha).55 77 percent of
the respondents in Kilosa said the quality of the services today was worse than
three years ago (compared to 66 percent in Kibaha).
Table 5.1 Perceptions on the quality ofpublic services
(in percent of total number of respondents)
Good 6 OAvera e 26 25Bad 66 75Don't know 2 O
Source: Fjeldstad and Semboja (1998)
The argument that tax resistance is correlated to deteriorating public services is
supported by other studies. Bukurura (1991 :91), for instance, refers to an
investigation from 1987 by the Tanzania News Agency in Kigoma Town Council,
which reported that "many people were defaulting apparently because they
thought the council was not doing its best to serve the residents", Tripp
(1997:233) refers to an artic1e in Daily News (from 9 June 1985) in which she
quotes a typical comment by a Dar es Salaam resident: "When it comes to
Development Levy we have .... seen nothing as aresult of the levy we pay..... the
city is very dirty and the situation is deteriorating day in and out.,.. What we
want to see is how such taxes are being spent."
Furthermore, taxpayers' compliance behaviour seems to be influenced by the maner
in which the tax law is admistered and enforced, We found that the severity of
sanctions has tended to fue1 tax resistance, Severe sanctions (e.g., strict
enforcement and harassment of taxpayers), and discontent with what people feel
they get in retum from the governent seem to increase tax resistance, and, thus,
contribute to explain the widespread tax evasion observed, Thus, tax authorities'
unesponsive, disrespectful and unfair treatment of taxpayers may foster disrespect
for and resistance against tax authorities and tax laws, Accordingly, harsh
enforcement and harassment by collectors may induce tax evasion, especially if no
expected services are provided in retur,
Tax resistance sometimes also takes more violent forms, In Kilosa DC we were
informed about tax collectors being attacked by the public, One collector had been
seriously wounded after being hit in the head with a panga (a large chopping knife
used by peasants) when he approached an assumed tax defaulter. In 1996 the ward
office in Chanzum was destroyed during night and the Tax Register Books were
55The response from people in Kilosa is interesting considering the long-term involvement of international
development aid agencies in the area. For instance, the main roads in Kilosa have afairly good standard due
to donor funding. Furthermore, donors are involved in the education and health sectors. However, people
seem to be well aware about who is providing the various services, and distinguish between "council
services" and "donor provided services". Thus, the main roads are referred to as "Irish roads", and the
almost non-passable feeder roads are named "council roads". Donors' presence in Kilosa may have
contributed to reveal the poor standard of local services for the constituents.
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bumt. In Kilosa, tax collectors avoided certain villages due to the high personal
risk involved in tax collection, Other villages were only visited by collectors
accompanied by the local militia. Cases of tax revolts are also reported from
councils in other regions, inc1uding Kilimanjaro Region and Coastal Region, For
instance, Daily News (28 November, 1997:5) reports that "(o)ver twenty Moshi
Municipal Council workers who were on a special operation to net development
levy defaulters were attacked by a mob at Mbuyuni Market on Wednesday
aftemoon and eight of them were injured, some seriously, it was leamed
yesterday, "
5.3.3 Corruption
Fiscal corrption is extensive in the councils studied,56 It takes many forms and
varies by types of taxes, methods of tax collection and location, It cuts across all
levels of the local governent, from the vilage to the district council headquarters,
Magnitude in terms of the amounts of money involved seems to rise by the
administrative leve! ofthe counci1.57
Although many cases of collusion between taxpayers and collectors are reported,
our findings show that the most common type of corrption is embezzlement of
revenues by tax collectors,58 Embezzlement is the form of tax revenues, which
does not accrue to the accounts of local governents, but is siphoned off by tax
collectors and administrators (Prud'homme, 1992), By definition the amount of
embezzlement is not recorded, The prevalence of embezzlement can be identified
on the basis ofindirect methods (see section 5,3,3.4), Furthermore, embezzlement
can be assumed on the basis ofthree observations:
. the leve! ofwages makes it necessary;
. the nature of the tax structure is astrong inducement to it; and
. the lack of controls makes it possible.
56 Fiscal corruption is here defined as any action in which tGJ collectors use their position to extort money
from tGJpayers or collude with tGJpayers to defraud the treasury or find some other means to embezzle money
from the tGJ authorities (Fjeldstad, 1999).57 In a survey organised by Commission on Corruption (URT, 1996a), focusing on corruption in service
deliveries in the police, judiciary, revenue departments and land services, corruption was also found to be
extensive (CIET International, 1996). The survey data indicated that around a third ofrecent users ofthefour
services had to pay, on request from the civil servant, a bribe in order to get service. Long delays in service
were reported, together with lack of useful information about the service. Such payments are often referred to
as "kitu kidogo" ("something small") or "chai" ("tea money"), or sometimes "lunch allowances" or were
said to be for "stationary to open the file". The "cheapest" service was the police, and the most expensive
one the lands service.153 civil servants employed in the four services in 10 district councils were also
interviewed. They were asked for their views about the level of corruption in public services in Tanzania.
More than half of them (57 percent) thought there was "very much" corruption in public services. This
proportion corresponds to the Tanzania average of 60 percent of the surveyed households who thought
corruption in public services was "very much ". About two thirds of the civil servants interviewed thought
corruption had worsened in the last five years.
58 We were informed about several cases of collusion in Kibaha and Kilosa De. For instance, in 1995 three
Vilage Executive Offcers in Kibaha DC (Bokomnemela vilage in Soga ward; Mwendapole vilage in
Kibaha ward; and Twendepamoja vilage in Tumbi ward) were fired due to dubious deals with tGJpayers on
cashew cess. In this case, no receipts were issued, and TSh 1,000,000 was evaded. The incident was
discovered by accident and reported by an offcial from the District Treasury Offce. In Kilosa DC in 1996,
10 ward revenue collectors and seven militiamen were retrenched due to mismanagement of funds.
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5.3.3.1 The official wage level
The offcial wages of local governent employees in Tanzania are very low, This
point is well documented in several studies, inc1uding World Bank (1994) and
Mans (1994).59 During the 1970s and 1980s, there has been severe erosion in the
real wages and salares of civil servants, Semboja and Therkildsen (1992), based
on Valentine (1983), estimate that real wages of civil servants in 1984 had fallen
to around 40 percent of the 1969 leve! for the lowest paid employees and to
almost one-tenth for the highest paid, The dec1ine continued up to 1988 when real
minimum wages were only 25 percent of the real minimum wage 20 years before,
Thus, in the late 1980s average salaries provided only one- fifth the purchasing
power ofthe 1970s.
Civil servants also receive monetary allowances of, on average, 35 percent of
wage remuneration, However, allowances differ significantly between the
different categories of civil servants. The upper ranks of the civil service also
enjoy several in kind benefits, such as free housing, telephone, and transport
(World Ban, 1994), According to Mans (1994:378), the average civil servants
package of wages and monetary allowances covers only about 40 percent of the
expenses of a typical household, To say that civil servants cannot live on their
wages is not ametaphor, but a statement of fact.
In arecent survey on corruption in service deliveries in Tanzania, 78 percent of
the respondents mentioned low salaries ofpublic service workers as being a major
incentive to seeking and accepting bribes (CIET International, 1996:24), One
responded stated:
Yau may find someane having not received sa1ary for at Ieast three or four months.
What do you think he wil eat? Re wil eat us!
As administrators and tax collectors do live, it means that they have other sources
of income in addition to their salares. Other sources of ten inc1ude income from
their shambas or from a second or third job in the private sector.60 There is,
however, astrong presumption that embezzlement constitutes a third additional
source of income, 61
5.3.3.2 The tax structure
The characteristics of the local governent tax system in Tanzania make
corrption relative ly easy, As described above, there are dozens of different taxes
for any given local governent. In addition, each of these taxes is expected to be
collected from hundreds of different taxpayers and/or different activities, Most of
these tax contributions are relatively small, The tax structure is such that not all of
these taxes can be collected, or are too costly to collect from an administrative
59 The structure of wages for civil servants is fixed unilaterally by the Government. This do es, however, not
include the staff of Bank of Tanzania and Tanzania Revenue Authority.60 In our survey in Kibaha and Kilosa, the majority of the tm: administrative staff interviewed said that they
had experienced to wait one to three months for their salary. When asked how they managed to survive, the
majority answered that they survived on products and incomes from their "shamba" (plot of land). Some also
said they had to borrow money from relatives.6/ These observations do not imply that increased salaries wil curb corruption. Wage incentives wil only
function in combination with other measures, including credible policies of monitoring and penalty schemes
(Fjeldstad, 1999). Thus, under a non-transparent tm: system, poor or no auditing and weak sanctions against
culprits, it may in fact be optimal for the government not to increase the pay package. Increased salaries in
such a situation most likely wil increase the administrative costs, without necessarily raising the tm:
revenues reported to the council treasury.
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point of view, Thus, budgeted taxes are not expected to be fully collected, and
they are indeed not. But if it is considered appropriate with a 80 percent ratio of
revenues collected to revenues budgeted, why not a ratio of 60 percent (or 50
) 62percent) that would leave room for 20 percent (or 30 percent ?
In addition, the revenue target for tax collection does not necessarily refer to the
budget, but to collect suffcient revenues to cover the wage bill of the counciL.
When this is achieved, the central governent will usually not interfere into the
affairs of the local authority, Since revenue estimates are based on information
from the administrative staff, inc1uding revenue collectors at the council
headquarter and the ward leveIs, there is room for under-budgeting, Thus, the
collectors can report enough revenues that cover the wage bill and pocket
whatever is left. 63
These arguments are supported by observations from Kibaha and Kilosa. The
performance of tax collectors at the ward and village levels is related to their
capability to collect enough revenues to cover their wage bils, In Kibaha DC, for
instance, several vilage executive officers (VEOs) and some ward revenue
collectors (WRC) had been fired in recent years, due to poor performance. Ward
executive offcers were, in general, transferred to less attractive or remote wards if
they did not perform according the wage bill criterion.64
5.3.3.3 Controls
The lack of effective controls also facilitates embezzlement. In principle, financial
control in local authorities in Tanzania is exercised through several mechanisms,
generally grouped into internal and extemal. However, as discussed in section
2,3,5, both functions are weak. In some councils no internal audit units are in
place, and the Controller and Auditor General' s Office suffers, in general, from
lImited capacity to carr out proper auditing.
5.3.3.4 Case studies
The combination of low wages, a non-transparent tax system, and lack of controls
facilitates corrption. To illustrate the mechanisms and scope of corrption we
will present a few cases:
Most taxes are collected in the form of cash (see section 2,3.2), The collector is
supposed to deliver a receipt of a standard form to the taxpayer, a copy
(counterfoil) of which is retained by his superiors to be audited. In principle, the
tax collector is required to retum the old receipt books showing used counterfoils
and unutilised receipts for audit so as to control their use before receiving new
ones, In practice, however, this procedure is often not followed. In Kilosa DC we
found evidence that large numbers of tax receipt counterfoils were not returned to
62 See Prudhomme (1992).
63 This system has some similarities with sharecropping systems in agriculture, and with ancient systems of
tax farming. Sharecropping is a land-tenure system where the landlord gets a (percentage) share of
agricultural output, and the tenant keeps the remaining output (Sah and Stiglitz, 1992). In tax farming the
right to collect taxes in a specifc area is auctioned off to private agents (Stella, 1993). The auction bid or
part of it is often paid in advance to the government. Then it is left to the tax farmer to collect (and keep)
whatever is collected. Since profit maximisation usually is the objective of tax farmers, tax enforcement may
imply extortive methods of collection and harassment of taxpayers (Webber and Wildavsky, 1986).64 We observed one exception from this practice: The Ward Executive Offcer in Lumbiji ward, Kilosa De,
wasfired in 1997 due to poor performance.
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the council headquarters as required by the financial regulations,65 It is reasonable to
assume that the counterfoils not retued are us ed to embezzle tax revenues, A note
from the distrct chief executive supported this proposition.
For development levy, we could estImate that the amount embezzled in this way in
1995 corresponded to more than 35 percent of the council's actual revenues from
development levy, The corresponding figure for 1996 was about 15 percent. It is not
possible to estimate the amount embezzled in this way for other categories of taxes
such as crop cess, livestock cess and market fees, since the receipts issued wil vary
from one trans action to the other, dep ending on the specific tax item, rates and unts,
However, for 1995 more than 30 percent of the receipt books issued for such taxes
were not retued,66
Thus, in practice, these receipts are often not available (by neglect or purpose),
and when they are utilised, they can easily be modified, One well-known method
of stealing money paid in by taxpayers is through the use of the carbon shipping
system (see, for instance, URT, 1996a:318; and TCCIA, 1995), The taxpayer is
given a receipt showing the amount paid, Since no carbon paper is put under the
original receipt in the process of writing, the collector later enters a lesser figure
on the copy and pockets the difference, Another method used by collectors is to
write receipts noting a lower amount than the amount paid by the taxpayer.
Collectors may use this method when dealing with taxpayers that cannot read or
write, In other cases, the carbon paper is placed in such away that the counterfeit
only registers a part of the figure on the taxpayer's receipt, for instance, omitting
some zeros,
In another case, which we followed over a period ofthee months in 1997, we found
evidence that only a small share of the maize cess collected at a maize market in
Kilosa DC actually was reported to the counciL. Maize is the major cessable crop in
this counciL. Sellers and buyers meet at a designated area dose to the main road
allocated to this purpose, The cess is collected by the ward officers (i.e" the Ward
Revenue Collector (WRC) and Ward Executive Offcer (WEO)) from the buyers at
the market area. According to the collectors, the maize cess is easy to collect. By
comparing the amount of cess collected, with the revenues reported in the
accounts of the district treasury for the same period, we found that less than 5
percent of the cess was actually reported, or to put it differently more than 95
percent of the revenues were embezzled,67
As noted in section 2,3.4, we found inconsistencies between the revenues
recorded by the village executive officers and the records at the ward leveL There
were also inconsistencies between the records of the ward and district leveIs, We
were informed about cases where tax collectors reported less revenue to the leve!
above than what was actually collected, However, we could not trace any systematic
65 In total, 771 receipt books were not returned in the period 6 January 1995 to 26 February 1997. The
number ofreceipts in each book variedfrom 50 to 150, depending on the type oftax (see section 2.3.5).66 A large number of the missing books were issued to the Distriet Revenue Inspector (DRI and the District
Accountant (DRA), both based at the distriet headquarter. The DRI is responsible for controlling and
inspecting collectors at lower leveIs. In the two-year period from January 1995, the DRI had not returned
126 receipt books. The corresponding figure for the DRA was 114 books. They continued to receive new
receipt books in spite of the faet of not having returned previously issued books.
67 During the visits to the market, the number of rnaize bags loaded on to lorries and the presence of the
collectors were recorded. In 1997, the cess was TSh 200 per bag à 100 kg.
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pattern that revenues reported decreased from one leve! to the one above in the
collection and reporting process.
We were also informed that embezzlement took place through collusion between
staff of the council's treasur deparment and bank officials, leading to the non-
banking oftax revenues: Bank offcials issue a receipt on the correct amount to the
treasury official. The receipt is brought back to the council's revenue offce for
control, and is consistent with the money remitted. However, only a part of the tax
revenues is actually deposited into the council' s account. The rest is shared
between the ban offcials and the collectors involved, This method may be
sustained over time since what actually is deposited in the council' s bank account
is rarely controlled, In our study, we were not able to trace any inconsistencies
between taxes reported by the revenue deparent of the councils studied and what
actually was deposited in the councils' bank accounts, However, experiences from
other councils indicate that large amounts are embezzled in this way, Recently, one
such case was brought to court, involving several staff members of the council's
revenue departent. The amount embezzled in this specific case durng the first 6
months of 1997, corresponded to 10 percent of the total own revenues of that council
in 1996, In early 1998, the Controller and Auditor General uncovered cases from 31
councils where cashbook-receipts were not reflected in the ban statements (see
appendix 2),68
We should, of course, be cautious when generalising on the basis of the cases
referred to above, They are specific for the councils studied, However, a surey of
newspaper aric1es on corrption in local authorities (appendix 2)69 and other studies
(inc1uding eIET International, 1996) indicate that corrption is an extensive
problem, Furthermore, embezzlement seems to be the major form of corrption,
Prolonged embezzlement of large amounts of tax revenues requires the
involvement of relevant senior offcials from the councils' headquarters, In one
council we found evidence of a corrption network involving the head of distrct
treasury, the district revenue inspector, the district accountant and ward executive
offcers, Furthermore, the prolonged existence and performance of such
corrption networks requires that:
(i) the tax collectors and tax inspectors are stationed relatively
permanently in their positions, i,e" they are rarely transferred;
(ii) the network is limited to a relatively small number of people in the
tax administration; and
(iii) taxpayers are not directly involved.
The exc1usion of taxpayers from the embezzlement corrption network is possible
because the tax collectors may indeed provide genuine receipts to taxpayers on
taxes paid, In some cases two sets of similar receipt books are used.
68 In the case referred to above, the embezzlement-network was revealed when a new treasurer took over and
initiated internal controIs.69 The survey covers the period March 1998 to January 1999. To collect this information we engaged a
person to read through as many Tanzanian newspapers as possible (both daily and weekly newspapers, in
English and Swahili). Due to other obligations som e newspapers were not read in periods. Thus, it is fair to
say that the newspaper reports provide a picture of the situation, although they most likely underestimate the
extent of corruption revealed.
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Whether fiscal corrption is more widespread at the local level cpmpared to the
central governent tax administration is beyond the scope of this study, The
Warioba-report (URT, 1996a) shows that corrption is extensive at alllevels of
the public sector in Tanzania, We have not come across any empirical studies
comparing corrption at the local and centralleveIs, However, some recent review
studies conc1ude that corruption is likely to be more prevalent at the local than at
the nationalleveL. According to Manor (1999:101), decentralisation "is always
attended by an increase in the number of persons who are involved in corrpt
acts", although this ne ed not imply that the overall amount of money diverted by
corrpt means increases. Prud'homme (1995:211) argues that there are probably
more opportunities for corrption at the locallevel: Firstly, local officials usually
have more discretionar powers than national decisionmakers. Secondly, local
bureaucrats and politicians are like1y to be more subj ect to pressing demands from
local interest groups in matters such as taxation. Tanzi (1996) supports these
views,
5.3.4 Political pressure
Political pressure is a major impediment to revenue collection in some councils
(see Semboja and Therkildsen, 1992:1107), This problem stems from the fact that
taxes are universally disliked and councillors who want to be re-elected ne ed to be
popular among the constituents, In some local authorities councillors are reluctant
to raise local taxes and charges, not only due to concems about their popularty,
but also because they may be major local landowners or businesspeople who
consider higher taxes as having direct negative impact on them. As aresult
councillors intervene in revenue collection, This intervention sometimes results in
conflicts between revenue collectors and the local politicians. For instance, a general
view expressed by the tax collecting staff in our survey was that councilors
obstrcted tax collection and were talking "cheap politics", In particular, this conflict
was evident in Kilosa DC, In Kibaha DC we did also observe certain tensions,
although less pronounced than in Kilosa, Furthermore, councilors in Kibaha seemed
to have a relatively stronger influence on tax collection and design compared to the
situation in Kilosa (see section 4.3), Such conflicts seem to be rooted partly in
divergent objectives with respect to tax design (see section 4,3), and partly in lack
of trust between administrators and politicians at the 10calleveL. Jacobsen (1999),
based on data from 14 district councils, finds that there is a "trust deficit" in the
political-administrative relations at the locallevel in Tanzania, Furthermore, lack
of trust seems to reduce the flow of information between politicians and
bureaucrats.70
Indications on the impacts of political intervention in tax collection can be found in
the councils' financial statements, For instance, some councils experience revenue
shortfalls in election years, particularly with respect to development levy, In a
sample of 48 councils, 31 experienced a drop in revenues in the election year
1995, This might be due to the influence of politicians (both local and central
governent politicians), For instance, we were informed that CCM-politicians (the
ruling part) tried to moderate the tax collectors' efforts to enforce taxes during
election years by issuing statements such as "don't harass taxpayers" or "relax on tax
collection", Politicians from the opposition paries, in contrast, approached taxpayers
directly and advised them "not to pay taxes", since taxes, according to their view,
70 Conflicts between council employees and local politicians are not of any new date in Tanzania. For
instance, Dryden (1968: 144-149), referring to the mid-1960s, describes same areas of conflict between these
stakeholders.
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were used to "finance the CCM-governent", Such statements are said to be
common durng election years,
The influence of local politicians on tax design and collection vary, as noted
above, between councils, This may have to do with the influence of international
donors, Through distrct development programes donors have often exerted strong
influence on the behaviours, decisions and actions oflocal authorities' adminstrators
and politicians (see table 4.1), In general, donors co-operate with council
administrators and staff to implement their activities, usually through the creation of
paralleI strctures, This has increased the influence and power of the bureaucracy,
most likely at the expense of the political system, In Kilosa Distrct Council, which
has a long history of donor support, we found indications that this was indeed the
case, and that it had implications for tax collection in two ways:
. Firstly, tax collection in Kilosa De is facilitated through harsh and violent
approaches that are mainly advocated and implemented by council
administrators, with minimum support from local politicians,
. Secondly, donor support may cushion council admnistrators against possible
taxpayers' opposition, Service provision though donor supported activities
provides a free riding opportity to council adrnnistrators who often c1aim to
be the providers of such services. This has provided opportunty for corrption,
In Kibaha, which has experienced limited donor support, local politicians, in
contrast, seem to play a more important role in the design and collection of
council revenues, Thus, tax collection is characterised with more laxity compared
to Kilosa, The leve! of corrption also seems to be lower in Kibaha. This may
have to do with the fact that local politicians to some extent monitor the
collectors. However, based on our data for the period 1992-95 we can not
ascertain the robustness ofthese observations.71
5,3,5 Negligence by government institutions, parastatals and co-operative unions
A final major administrative problem faced by many councils is the negligence of
governent institutions and parastatals in submitting the taxes and charges they
owe to local authorities', Local governent offcials canot easily turn off the
water supplies to schools and hospitals, and they cannot force central governent
ministries, distrct commissioners or other local authorities to pay for such
services.
Furthermore, many councils have experienced huge problems in collecting crop
cess from the co-operative unions, Semboja and Therkildsen (1989:40) argue that
the change from the seller to the buyer as the payer of cess has resulted in
increased liquidity problems for many councils since they have to wait to receive
the tax until the buyers (in particular, unions) have sold the crops and received the
payment (see section 3,3.2), Our interviews with district and union offcials in
Kibaha and Kilosa revealed that co-operative unions often were reluctant to pay
cess owed to the counci1.72 In 1995, for instance, the Mlandizi Disunyara Co-
operative Union in Kibaha DC was brought to court for not paying the cashew nut
71 Fjeldstad (1999a) provides a set of propositions to explain these observations.
72 These observations are consistent with the report of the Tax Commission (URT, 1991). Skoog (1998)
argues that non-payment of taxes by the parastatal sector is an application of the soft budget constraint
where the state tends to bai! out state-owned companies in financìal trouble, in spile of the tremendous
problems of the entire system that result.
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cess, and thereby forced to pay the TSh 800.000 it owed, In June 1997 Kilosa DC
was preparing a court case against the sugar company due large arears in cess
remission,73 The maize co-operative in Kilosa was also plagued with continued
financial problems with implications for remitting cess to the counciL. This was to
some extent the case for the cashew nut co-operative in Kibaha, too. SimI1ar cases
have been reported from other councils. For instance, ERB (1997) reports that the
company SHIRECU owed Mashwa DC TSh 50 milion in crop cess, which was
equivalent to more than 50 per cent of the council's total tax revenues in 1995,
The same company also owed Meatu DC TSh 33 million (equivalent to 34 per
cent of the council' s tax revenues in 1995), and Kahama DC TSh 10 million
(equivalent to 5 per cent of the tax revenues in 1995), Altogether various
companies owed Meatu DC TSh 60 milion equivalent to more than 60 per cent of
its tax revenues in 1995.
5.4 Why the current revenue system has been maintained
Why has the present tax system persisted for such a long period of time in spite of
all its weaknesses? One proposition may be that the important stakeholders,
inc1uding bureaucrats and politicians, as well as powerful taxpayers, resist
changes in an attempt to protect their influence and control of the local tax
system,74 For instance, some observers argue that extensive public sector
regulations, complicated tax systems, etc, are the result of a deliberate strategy by
civI1 servants, inc1uding senior tax offcials, to facilitate corrption (Tanzi, 1998;
Winters, 1996; Flatters and Mac1eod, 1995; and Myrdal, 1968;).75 We have no
indications that this is the case in local authorities in Tanzania. A deliberate
strategy requires capacity and detailed knowledge on how the tax system works,
and the capacity at the local leve! is in general poor. However, the combination of
a complicated tax system and poor administrative capacity breeds corrption and
facilitates evasion, Thus, when the non-transparent tax system is in place, it is
rational for the stakeholders to maintain the system in spite of the ineffciencies it
generates because it also performs other functions, Firstly, it offers informal
incomes for civil servants and their social network members, Secondly, the tax
system provides a visible arena for local councilors to play out their political
aspirations vis-à-vis their constituents, Thirdly, some powerful taxpayers, in
particular businesspeople, landowners, parastatals and the co-operative unions
may be interested in keeping the tax system as it is since it facilitates evasion and
tax exemptions, Finally, lack of trust between the stakeholders involved may
increase their risk aversion and thereby contributing to maintain and even
reinforce the existing tax structure.W e have not been able to trace the explanatory
power of this proposition, which should be considered an issue for further
research.
73 Information provided by council offciaIs.
74 Therkildsen (1999) has an interesting discussion on the role of various stakeholders, including foreign
donors, in public sector reforms in Tanzania. He argues, for instance, that the Ministry of Health resisted the
restructuring of regional administration and the subsequent reform of local government in Tanzania, as it
regarded these reforms to be a threat to the ministry 's plans to centralise health services.
75 According to Winters (1996: 166), the strongest resistance to tax reforms in Indonesia came from the tax
offcials themselves, since they had the most to lose from the depersonalisation and simplifcation of the tax
system. Flatters and Macleod (1995:409), also referring to Indonesia, assert that tax collectors actively
opposed simplifcations in property tax administration, income tax laws and tariff structures.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter has focused on administrative problems in tax collection. First, the
administrative costs relative to the revenues reported are high. Second, large gaps
exist between the revenue potential and what actually is reported to the council
treasury, A set of five arguments are presented to explain this wedge: (1) Poor
administrative capacity to enforce taxes; (2) tax evasion and resistance from
taxpayers; (3) widespread corrption, mainly in the form of embezzlement; (4)
political pressure on the tax administration to relax on revenue collection; and (5)
negligence from governent agencies and parastatals to pay taxes, We have not
been able to trace the explanatory power of each of these factors, Most like ly their
combined effects contribute to explain the observations, Probably there are also
variations between councils.
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6 Options for fiscal reforms
6.1 Introduction
It is c1ear from the above analysis that the local governent tax system in
Tanzania is overripe for reform. Although local taxes represent less than 5 percent
of total tax revenues in Tanzania, the large number of these taxes, together with
their unsatisfactory nature means that their economic, political and social impacts
are considerably more significant than their figure implies,76
The current local tax system is partlya result of poor administrative capacity for
tax collection and tax design, political pressure and lack of co-ordination between
the local and central governent (see chapter 5). Thus, redesigning the tax
structure and building local administrative capacity may contribute to reduce
revenue losses caused by inefficiencies and corrption, However, tax resistance is
likely to increase without improvements in service delivery, necessitating costly
and coercive methods of tax enforcement that will further undermine the
legitimacy of the governent. Improvement in service delivery - a key objective
of public sector reforms in Tanzania - is therefore a necessary condition to
improve tax compliance,
6.2 Tax compliance and service delivery
There is a widespread discontent among people regarding their terms of trade with
the governent (section 5.3.2), Peoples' tax resistance seems to be correlated to
deteriorating public services (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998), It might be argued
that individuals pay taxes because they value the goods provided by the
governent, recognising that their payments are necessary both to help finance
the goods and services and to get others to contribute (Alm et aL., 1992:313),77
Thus, a taxpayer may be seen as exchanging purchasing power in the market in
return for governent services, Fiscal exchange, however, requires trade-off gains
that may be seen as prerequisites of voluntary compliance (Levi, 1988:56).
Without a material benefit, compliance becomes less assured, The existence of
positive benefits may increase the probability that taxpayers will comply
voluntarily, without direct coercion.78
76 We have not yet obtained aggregate figures on local government own revenues from the Ministry of
Regional Administration and Loeal Government (June 1999). Thus, our most recentfigures refer to 1993 and
1994 (obtained from Tanzania Revenue Authority). The fiscal year or loeal authorities follows the calendar
year, while thefiscal year of the central government isfrom 1 July to 30 June (see appendix 4). In 1993,for
instance, the local government own revenues corresponded to 5 percent of total central government revenues
for 1993/94, and in 1994, the percentage was 4 percent (of central government revenues for 1994/95). It is
reasonable to assume that the percentage is even lower today due to the improved central government tax
collection after the establishment of Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) in 1996. Total central government
revenues (tax and non-tax revenues) in 1997/98 were TSh 571.4 bilion. 4 percent ofthis amount represent
TSh 22.9 billon.
77 Fjeldstad and Semboja (1998:25) found that people in the vilages surveyed in Kibaha and Kilosa
understood the relationship between taxes and public services. One respondent used the metaphor that "one
can 't build a house without first buying concrete n. Furthermore, a majority of the respondents said they
would be wiling to pay more taxes if services were improved, although some expressed the reservation that it
depended on their ability to pay.
78The potential for free riding is, however, obvious when the government (jffers collective goods in return for
taxes (see, e.g., Cowell and Gordon, 1988).
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Most taxpayers are of course not able to ass ess the exact value of what they
receive from the governent in return for taxes paid, However, it can be argued
that the taxpayer has general impressions and attitudes concerning his own and
others' terms of trade with the governent (Richupan, 1987: 154),79 If this is the
case, then it is reasonable to assume that a taxpayer's behaviour is affected by his
satisfaction or lack of satisfaction with his terms of trade with the governent.
Therefore, if the system of taxes is perceived to be unjust, tax resistance may, at
least partly, be considered as an attempt by the taxpayer to adjust his terms of
trade with the governent. 80
To minimise the costs of tax enforcement and to maximise the output that can be
taxed, the governent must create voluntary compliance through non-coercive
strategies that produce a high leve! of taxpayer co-operation,81 It must create
confidence in its capacity to deliver returns for taxes paid, Furthermore, it must
convince taxpayers that taxpayer contributions make a difference in producing the
desired goods, and it must co-ordinate the actions of taxpayers so that each
perceives others doing their share, too (Levi, 1988), Thus, the challenges facing
the governent are to improve public service delivery, and to secure funding to
provide basic services. However, whatever is done to improve the local
governent revenue system, the reality is that local authorities in Tanzania will
continue to be heavily dependent for their sustenance on fiscal transfers from
above.82 Transfers should therefore be considered an important component of the
decentralisation programme, 
83
In this setting, the fundamental problems to be addressed in the context of local
governent fiscal reforms are:
(1) To redesign the current revenue structure,
(2) To build tax compliance through improved service delivery,
6.3 Redesigning the current revenue structure
There is undoubtedly room for improved fiscal and financial management in local
authorities, and improved co-ordination between the different levels of
governent. Measures may inc1ude, as suggested in a recent report to the
governent (Price Waterhouse, 1998), capacity building, inc1uding training
programmes for all actors involved in revenue mobilisation and collection,
However, attempts to squeeze additional revenues from poorly designed taxes
may have negative effects on the economy and the society in general (see section
5,3.1), In general, improved tax administration cannot compensate for bad tax
79 Survey research from Western countries also suggests that taxpayers make judgements about the fairness of
particular taxes. See,for instance, Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), and Smith (1992).
8°Non-compliance might be an important resource of political change. Scott (1985), argues that one of the
most important "weapons of the weak" is the ability to withdraw compliance. This can take a passive form,
such as shirking, or an active form, such as rebellon. Historically, unwilingness of the population to comply
with a tax that is deemed unjust has been a catalyst for political action. The Boston tea party and the
Thatcher poll tax are ilustrative examples, while Bates (1983) provides some examples from Africa.
81 In the context of taxation there wil always be an element of coercion. Thus, "quasi-voluntary compliance"
is probably a better concept.
82This has been the situation since independence Referring to the mid-1960s Dryden (1968:128) writes: "The
dependence of rural councils upon support from central government and the ruling party is a prominent
fea ture of local government at its present stage of development".83 Transfers are a large part of sub-national finance in most countries. Rare exceptions are the Scandinavian
countries that have allocated substantial taxing powers to local authorities.
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design. Thus, reforming the tax structure should precede the reform of tax
administration since there is not much merit in making a bad tax system work
somewhat better,
In redesigning the tax strctue, the following options should be considered:
(i) the abolishment ofunsatisfactory local taxes;
(ii) improvements to remaining revenue bases; and
(iii) cost recovery through user charges,
6,3,1 Abolishment ofunsatisfactory local taxes
Given the poor performance of many local taxes, any reform programme should
inc1ude the abolition of a large number of these taxes, In particular development
levy should be abolished. This is a tax that we have found to be costly to enforce,
The levy is extremely unpopular among taxpayers and tax resistance is
widespread (see section 3,3,1), Furthermore, the levy represents an extra income
tax on formal sector employees.
Furthermore, a reform should inc1ude the abolition of nuisance taxes like bicyc1e
tax, livestock levy, entertainment levy, etc" Many of the licences should also be
abolished since they rarely have a regulatory fuction, This should also be the fate of
many fees that simply have a high nuisance value and that costs more to enforce than
what they yield in terms of revenues, inc1uding push cart fees, cattle trekkng fee,
bicyc1e registration fee, etc, (see table 2,1),
6.3,2 Improvements to remaining taxes
In particular, there is a ne ed to simplify the licence and fee structures by reducing
the number of rates and coverage, Charges should in principle only be levied
when services are provided, For instance, advertisement board fee, sand fee and
business licences may be retained since they have a certain regulatory fuction,
However, there is a need to haronise fees and licenses with central governent
taxes, to avoid double taxation, Furhermore, the establishment of unform rates on
some major crop cesses at the nationallevel should be considered, In this context
one may consider the appointment of revenue collection agencies, inc1uding the
possibility to centralise the collection of certain taxes, For instance, cess on export
crops could be collected at their points of export by Tanzania Revenue Authority,84
Export taxes should, in general, be discouraged, But at present many local cess rates
are very high, discouraging export production, The 20 percent cess on cashew nuts
in Kibaha DC provides an ilustrative example (see section 3,3,2). High local cess
rates can also be found on other export crops, inc1uding coffee and tea, Thus, by
abolishing alllocal cesses and imposing a lower (flat) national cess rate on export
crops across all councils, the effective tax rate on these products can be reduced, For
instance, a 10 percent tax on export crops would levy TSh 21 billon, equivalent to
3,7 percent of total central governent tax revenues in 1997/98.85
84 It is sometimes argued that the central government needs to exercise fight controlover money that comes
from the centre, but local governments should be free to do what they like with their "own" revenues, such as
local taxes. However, the fact is that all money comes from the taxpayer, and it is largely a matter of
convenience which level of government collects particular taxes. Thus, Devas (1997:358) argues that tight
controlover certain sources of money and wide discretion over others is somewhat ilogical if the objecfive is
to ensure proper use of public resources and to protect citizens.85 This estimate is based on a total export value in 1997 of TSh 213.45 bilion (USD 355.75 milion) for the
major export crops cojJee, cotton, sisal, tea, tobacco and cashew nuts (URT, 1998:55).
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For larger establishments the hotellevy has been subsumed into the V AT rate of 20
percent, collected by the central governent. Thus, local governents' should not
impose hotellevy on the top of V AT. Since, smaller hote1s and guesthouses with an
annual turnover of less than TSh 20 million are not registered for V AT, the levy
could in principle be retained for the smaller establishments. However, the incentives
to evade are large and the possibilities to monitor smalL. It is therefore a need to
reconsider the suitability ofhotellevy as a local revenue source.
Property tax may continue to be an important source of revenue in urban councils
(see table 2.2), It may also become important in semi-urbanised centres in distrct
councils,86 In recent years, some rual councils have passed by-Iaws levying taxes
for commercialland use (for instance, Hai District Councils and Simanjiro DC),
Commercialland use inc1udes agriculture, mining operations, sand extraction etc..
Some consultants even c1aim that commercial land tax "wil be one of the
principal revenue source for most of the rural councils" (Price Waterhouse, 1998),
Land and property taxes have some attractions as local bases since they are
imposed on immobil e resources, and therefore are diffcult to avoid - at least in
principle, However, as noted in section 3,3.5, they also have some obvious
weaknesses that ne ed to be taken into consideration before too heavy reliance is
placed on them as major local governent revenue sources. These weaknesses are
parly of political and partly administrative character, manifested in problems of
valuation and tax enforcement.87 In theory, assessment of property value and
revenue collection are straightforward: conduct a cadastral surey that assesses the
market or site value of each plot of land or property, and send a tax bil to each
owner. In practice, cadastral surveys are expensive and time-consuming, Tax offices
are, in general, short on assessors, ifthey have any at all, Thus, it is of ten difficult to
maintain assessments, and assessments are often eroded by inflation. In principle,
non-compliance of propert tax can be enforced by confiscation and sale of the
owner's personal effects in the building initially, and, ultimately, upon the collateral
of the real estate itself (Price Waterhouse, 1998). However, it may prove diffcult to
carr out such tax enforcement: Firstly, cours are often swamped by appeals from
angr property- and landowners (see Skinner, 1993:364). Secondly, harsh
enforcement mechansms may result in intervention from politicians facing
complaints from their constituents,
Experience from other countries and historical evidence from Tanzania advocate
cautiousness when (1) extending the present propert tax to district councils, and (2)
when imposing a commercialland tax in local authorities (see section 3,3,5). At this
stage of the reform process it is important to identify the fundamental causes of the
problems experienced in depth and with open minds, avoiding counterproductive
biases. In paricular, it is important to seriously consider the administrative capacity
to maintain assessments of propert value. Furhermore, the enforcement
86 In some Western countries, including Denmark and Norway, local property taxation is a good source of
local taxation. In Denmark, for instance, property taxes are levied on land values. According to Lotz
(1997: 188), the rate for a given municipality is the same for all types of property, and assessments of
property are adjusted annually. Furthermore, the same rate applies to households and to enterprises. There
are also rules to reduce the tax for elderly people.
87 According to Clark (1997:33), in Canada the property tax has been more difcult to find a tax base for
than any other tax. One problem is related to valuation of real property based on market prices.
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mechansms must be carefully designed to avoid a mushrooming number of court
cases.
In general, a fundamental requirement when rede signing the local tax system is a
greater concern with the cost-effectiveness of revenue collection, taking into
account not only the direct costs of tax administration, but also the overall excess
burden to the economy, inc1uding the compliance costs to the taxpayers (Devas,
1988), To these aims increased staff productivity and reduced losses through
corrption and tax evasion are needed. Such improvements may take a long time
to achieve, although a simplification of the local revenue system should be a
positive contribution towards these aims,
As discussed above, the capacity of local governents is very weak in tax design
(see section 4.4), The resource requirements for building this capacity at the local
leve! are high, and can only be done in the medium to long run. Therefore, in the
short run, very c1ear guidelines and limits should be given by the central
governent regarding tax design, Furthermore, the current system of approving
tax by-Iaws should be strengthened (Semboja, 1999), In particular, there is an
urgent need to improve co-ordination with the national tax system, Thus, one may
consider establishing an expert committee (a "Finance Commission") to advise
both the Ministers of Finance and Local Governent on the local governent tax
system, This committee should advise the two ministers before the by-Iaw is
approved, The expert committee is not aimed at substituting the work of staff at
the council and Ministry of Local Governent. However, since it may require
more resources than is avaI1able in the short term to buI1d relevant capacity at the
councils and the Ministry of Local Governent, the importance of a "Finance
Commission" can not be overemphasised,
6.3,3 eost recovery through user charges
To obtain a better relation between demand and supply of public services, then
taxes are not the best mechanism, Better links can be achieved through cost-
recovery charging systems, Moreover, user charges may contribute to simplifying
many of the present intergovernental problems (Bennett, 1990: 21).
User charges tie the amount paid directly to the amount of a service a consumer
uses. Thus, responsiveness to customers may be achieved through cost recovery
mechanisms. User charges can also reflect differences in ability to pay by
incorporating sliding scales for type ofuser or amount ofusage (Rondinell et aL.,
1989:71), although this wil require adequate administrative capacity, By
committing resources contributors may become more concerned with the success
of development investments, Accordingly, user charges may have the potential
of:88
. improving resource allocation;
. controlling the possibility of "crowding out" by imposing a uniform basis for
competition which allows alternative suppliers in the non-governental area
to survive and develop;
. stimulating a c10ser respons e of service producers to customer demands which
in turn should raise quality and remove unnecessary production; and
. improving social equity and environmental policy by incorporating the social
costs of externalities,
88 See Bennett (1990) and Jimenez (1987).
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There are obviously a number of constraints on user charges and other means of
cost recovery in Tanzania, These arise, for instance, from equity considerations,
fluctuations in demand, and the relations between services financed by charges
and private sector provision compared to those financed by public general
revenues, However, within these constraints there is a scope for innovation
(Bennett, 1990:22), The governent as well as the public opinion have too readily
seen general revenue, particularly tax revenue, as the "normal" financial source, It
has been the easy way out of difficult decisions, illustrated by the large and
increasing number of taxes in local authorities, However, general sources are not
only frequently less efficient compared to user charges, but are also frustrating the
objective of achieving proper relation of supply and demand, Thus, there is a need
for greater use of mechanisms of exchange based on realistic pricing and other
cost-recovery methods,
6.4 Intergovernmental fiscal transfers
The basic rationale for a system of transfers is the existence of a fiscal gap at the
local governent leve! arising out of own-revenue and own-expenditure
assignents (Ahad, 1997), In addition, the national governent may wish to
ensure that people in different regions and localities have access to an established
"minimum" standard of public services, It is beyond the scope of this study to
quantify the financial resources needed in the form of transfers from the central
governent. Magnitudes are also difficult to estimate because of lack of reliable
information on expenditures, size and conditions of existing infrastructure, and
absence of realistic and appropriate operation and maintenance standards.
However, as argued by Semboja and Therkildsen (1992:1104), to achieve
adequate service standards expenditures need to be raised to a certain threshold
leveL. This applies both to salary and non-salary funding. Increments below this
funding leve! will only have limited impacts,
Promoting fiscal responsibility at the local governent leve! calls for
implementation of a stable and transparent system of transfers from the central
governent to the local authorities, geared to filling any ex-ante gap between the
assigned spending and revenue-raising responsibilities of the latter (Ter-
Minassian, 1999:57), The definition of such a system is far from easy, especially
given the ne ed to preserve adequate incentives for tax effort and cost effectiveness
in spending by the local governents,
Stability and transparency considerations call for formula-based revenue-sharing
(see section 6.4.2) and other general-purpose transfer systems (see section 6.4.3),
However, in this process of fiscal decentralisation it is important to be aware of
the risks for macroeconomic management and fiscal discipline, Mechanisms of
fiscal transfers may impose considerably rigidity to the central governent
budget. Therefore, substantial devolution of revenues and sp ending
responsibilities to local authorities can affect the central governent' s ability to
car out stabilisation and macroeconomic adjustment through the budget.
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The destabilising potential of local governents' is greatest when they face no
hard budget constraint (World Bank, 1999),89 Expectations of bail-out in case of
financial trouble weaken the incentives to economise on costs, and thus generate
resource waste and rigidity within local authorities, These inefficiencies, in turn,
may spil over into macro-economic imbalances, Thus, short-run macro-economic
management considerations call for effective limits on local governents '
deficits, consistent with national objectives for growth, inflation and balance of
payments, The creation of institutional forums to ensure a regular and frequent
dialogue between the central governent and local authorities on budget trends
may help in this respect (Ter-Minassian, 1999:58),
There are a number of methods to dose the fiscal imbalances of local authorities,
some ofwhich also reduce imbalances between councils (Ahad, 1997:6), In this
respect we may distinguish between:
. revenue sharing, and
. grants,
6.4,1 Revenue sharing
The most satisfactory tax fields according to the criteria outlined in section 3
belong to the central governent. Based on effciency and administrative
considerations the central governent should keep the major taxes, especially the
corporate income tax, multistage taxes such as the V AT, and taxes on foreign
trade (Tanzi, 1996; Ahad, 1997), Thus, if the sole concern of the central
governent is simply to fill a vertical fiscal gap one way would be to give local
authorities a share of major national taxes collected in the counciL. Local
governents may assist in revenue mobilisation by providing information on local
taxpayers, and thereby increasing the pool of tax revenues, For instance, by
sharing a mere 5 percent of national taxes would provide around TSh 35 bilion,
equivalent to 1.5 times the estimated local governent own revenues for 1997
(see section 6,1),90
Tax revenues can be shared on a tax-by-tax basis or on the entire pool of central
governent tax revenues, The problem with the tax-by-tax sharing arrangement is
that it may giv e the central governent an incentive to concentrate its collection
and enforcement efforts on the taxes that are either not shared or shared to a lesser
degree (Ahad, 1997:5), Furthermore, the central governent may have an
incentive to concentrate increases in rates (for instance for stabilisation puroses)
on the shared taxes, something that may distort the tax system, Therefore, revenue
sharing based on the entire pool of governent revenues may be preferable,
Revenue sharing, which transfers a portion of the national proceeds of a tax
according to a predetermined formula, is much like a general-purpose
unconditional block grant.
To secure the local governents a certain predictability to revenues, which is
important for budget planning, the coefficients of revenue sharing between the
two levels of governent should be set in law. However, this may imply
considerably rigidity to central governent budget, and may contribute to di lute
89 Skoog (1998) provides an interesting analysis ol the origin and persistence ol the soft budget constraint
within the parastatal sector in Tanzania.
90 Based on budget estimateslor 1998/99 (URT, 1998).
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the impact of fiscal tightening, For example, if the central governent tries to
tighten fiscal policy by raising shared taxes, this move will also give the local
governents more resources for sp ending , This outcome may be avoided if the
portion of revenue going to the local governents is levied at a constant rate on
the shared tax base. Fixed revenue-sharing arrangements may also have pro-
cyc1ical effects as tax revenue automatically rises during a boom, and thereby
increasing the spending capacity of the local governents, while declining
revenue during economic downtums forces them to cut back spending suddenly,
To address this problem, some element of flexibility could be introduced in these
sharing arrangements, for instance, by relating the transfers to a moving average
of central governent revenues or by requiring local governents to build up
revenue stabilisation funds to even out cyc1ical fluctuations in shared taxes,
The distribution of shared revenues among local governents can be made on a
derivation basis, with each council getting the same share of the revenue collected
in its district. In this way revenue sharing avoids the problems associated with
local governent tax administration and policy haronisation, However, this
does not address the problem of horizontal imbalances, Local governent
autonomy over revenue bases and rate structures are also sacrificed,
6,4,2 Grants
Besides revenue sharing, the main mechanism for intergovernental transfers is
grants from central to local governents, In principle, there are three broad
categories of grants (Ahad, 1997):
(1) Unconditional grants: These are general-purpose transfers aimed at
addressing vertical imbalances.
(2) Conditional grants: These grants carr conditions regarding the use of the
funds, Sometimes the conditions are tied to the performance to be achieved in
the programmes financed through them,
(3) Equalisation grants: These are used to address horizontal imbalances between
local authorities. The purose of horizontal equalisation is to equalise the
capacity of local governents to provide a "national standard" leve! of public
goods and services, The grants also have the effect of c10sing the vertical
fiscal gap,
A key element in the ongoing decentralisation reform in Tanzania is the provision
of conditional block grants from the centre to local authorities, These are planed
to be introduced as a pilot project in 35 local authorities in January 2000,
Conditional block grants are earmarked to finance major nationally defined
services, such as primary education, primary health, water supply, agricultural
extension and roads, rather than specific programmes, The conditionality refers to
earmarking to certain broad-based services (education, water, etc.), but not to
particular budget lines (personal emoluments, etc,), According to Price
Waterhouse (1998), the grants will be based on minimum standards of service to
be defined by the sector ministries in negotiation with representatives of local
governents. These grants relate only to recurrent costs, Such earmarking of
grants will of course limit the autonomy of local governents, and thereby partly
negating the arguments for decentralisation (Wolman, 1990). However, imposing
conditions may be justified by distributional considerations, such as the need to
ensure minimum nation-wide standards for the provision of services of national
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concern, Thus, to even out income among jurisdictions, a formula could be based
on redistributive criteria which may combine population, income per capita,
indicators ofbackwardness, etc.,
In addition to the major services set out above, other services will be funded by
unconditional block grants, These include district culture, community
development, natural resources (Price Waterhouse, 1998), In the past these sectors
have been supported by the central governent through the payment of salaries.
As unconditional grants there are no minimum standards of service defined nor
any performance indicators, Thus, these grants may be used at the discretion of
the council to provide services in line with the objectives of the area, and will be
accounted for through the council' s accounting system.
Based on experiences with the present transfers system, two factors seem to be
critical to ensuring the effectiveness of the block grant system.91 These are:
. accountability, and
. predictability
Regarding accountability, financial management and control of the recurrent
grants suffer from several weaknesses, These relate to the absence of internal
audit sections, poor reporting systems and non-compliance with established
financial regulation, Furthermore, large shares of the grants disbursed for the
education and health sectors are diverted to other issues (Semboja, 1999:12),
Financial reports are complicated and unclear, and are not easily understood by
professionals, Therefore, the local governent Finance and Planning Committee
and the Full Council meetings allocate little time on the accounting of recurrent
grant funds, Thus, the current system of disbursing grants gives the district
treasurers the entire information power and opens room for mi suse of such power
and council resources (Semboja, 1999: 15).
Regarding predictability, local authorities have experienced delays and
irregularities in the receipt of grants, In principle, all the budgeted grants approved
by Parliament shall be disbursed at the same time. However, in practice, priority is
given to personal emoluments (PE) and public debt (including pensions), while
other charges (OC) has received a residual status. Semboja (1999:5), reports that
in general councils receive less than the budgeted OC, For instance, during the
five months period October 1998 to February 1999, Kisarawe DC received only
45 percent of the approved budget. The respective percentages were 66 percent for
Dar es Salaam, 87 percent for Kibaha, 89 percent for Rufiji, 91 percent for Mafia,
and 95 percent for Bagamoyo, According to Semboja (1999), predictability is
further weakened since there is no obvious criterion for determining the leve! of
OC disbursed to the various councils,
Thus, experiences indicate that it may be problematic in practice to design and
enforce appropriate conditions for grants, Without substantial capacity building in
91 For a long time, central government grants to local governments in Tanzania have been earmarked by
pur pose and sector. In the former, the central government specifes the amounts to be paid as personal
emoluments (PE) and other charges (OC). In general, PE has received priority over OC that has received a
residual status. Until now, the earmarked sectoral grant has been confined to education, health, water and
roads for both PE and Oe. Furthermore, it covers the personal emoluments of all the staff of non-grant
sectors earning a salary of at least GS2, except those in the Administration and Finance Departments whose
salaries are covered from the council 's own revenues. Procedures for disbursement and the role of the
various stakeholders involved are described in Semboja (1999).
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financial management and monitoring, controls may end up being more formal
than substantive, opening up for increased mismanagement and corrption, It may
even become more diffcult to specify and enforce conditionality on the
performance of the sectors supported by the block grants,
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we have argued that a reform of the local governent tax structure
should precede the reform of tax administration since there is not much merit in
making a bad tax system work somewhat better. Thus, given the poor
performance of many local taxes, A large number of these taxes should be
abolished. There is also room for improvements in the design of some current
taxes, including uniform national rates on major local taxes such as crop cess,
Furthermore, a fundamentallocal governent fiscal reform must address the issue
of tax compliance, and thereby the relationship between taxes and service
provision. Without improvements in service delivery tax resistance is likely to
increase, and thereby further eroding the legitimacy of the governent at both
local and centrallevels, Thus, the challenges facing the governent are to
improve public service delivery, and to secure funding to provide basic services,
However, whatever is done to improve the local governent revenue system, the
reality is that local authorities in Tanzani,a wil continue to be heavily dependent
for their sustenance on fiscal transfers from above. Transfers should therefore be
considered an important component of the decentralisation programe,
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7 Concluding remarks
Tanzania is now implementing a local governent reform, An important component of the
reform is to increase the fiscal autonomy of local authorities. This policy is encouraged and partly
initiated by the donor community, The above fmdings suggest that care must be taken in
implementing this policy, It is unealistic to expect that the present admnistration in many
councils has adequate capacity and the required integrty to manage increased fiscal autonomy, In
fact, there is a real danger that, in the absence of substantial simplification and restructung of the
current revenue system combined with capacity building and improved integrty, increased
autonomy may raise rnsmanagement and corrption in many councils.
It is particularly important for the time being to impose hard budget constraints on the local
authorities, through a design of intergovernental fiscal relations that ensures for the local
governents an adequate balance between expenditure responsibilities and their own revenues,
in addition to clearly defined transfers from the centre,
It is beyond doubt that large and dramatic changes are necessary to improve performance and
to re-establish legitimacy of the local governent system, However, the present speed with
which the decentralisation programme seems to impose reforms may prove counter-productive,
Furthermore, substantial decentralisation is likely to make it more complicated for the central
governent to carr out macroeconomic stabilisation through budgetary policies, Therefore,
due to Tanzania's acute fiscal imbalances and its aid dependency, decentralisation should
probably progress more slowly and cautiously,
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Appendix 1: Objectives and Coverage of the 1996-1998 Field
Studies
The field studies aimed at providing data and analyses of the capacities and constraints of the
local tax administrations, especially in relation to tax design, revenue collection, incentive
problems and service delivery, Furthermore, the studies aimed to assess the extent and
problems of (non)-compliance behaviour, by trying to umavel peoples' perceptions regarding
taxation and the decisions they made, especially in relation to other taxpayers, tax collectors,
politicians and the local governent council, inc1uding service delivery.
The studies covered all three council leveIs, namely district headquarter, the wards and the
village 1evels, In Kibaha DC, four wards and four villages were selected for in-depth study,
inc1uding three rural vilages, and one peri-urban vilage, In Kilosa DC the study comprised
three wards and three villages, ofwhich two rural and one peri-urban vilage (see Fjeldstad and
Semboja, 1998), The villages were selected on the basis of (1) representativeness, which
required a balanced representation of rural and urban life, and (2) accessibility, Information
was collected from a variety of sources and through different methods, At the district
headquarer, official documents and data were collected, primarily the final financial
statements and accounts of the council disaggregated on revenue bases, wage bils and lists of
staffmembers in the revenue department, and by-Iaws. At the ward and vilage levels tax fies
and lists oftaxpayers were obtained where available, In addition, staffmembers ofthese bodies
and local politicians were interviewed on matters relating to tax design, decision-making
processes, tax collection and revenue reporting procedures, incentive problems, and
perceptions of the provision and quality of public services, These interviews were organised as
semi-structured interviews, which also inc1uded questions on the background of the
respondent, inc1uding education, salar, and how long he had had the present position,
Furthermore, two surveys of taxpayers' were carred out. One questionnaire was designed for
development levy, and comprised i 72 respondents (see Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998 for
details), The other questionnaire focused on crop cesses and comprised 36 respondents, These
questionnaires were organised around five main headings: (i) Background information on the
respondents; (ii) admitted (non-)compliance; (iii) tax enforcement; (iv) perceptions of other
taxpayers' behaviour; and (v) perceptions of the terms of trade with the governent. In
addition, following up field visits and data collection on specific issues, inc1uding corrption,
were carried out during 1997 and 1998,
Data on tax revenues for about 50 councils were collected from the Ministry of Local
Governent in Dodoma. Data on central governent taxes were acquired from the Ministry of
Finance and Tanzania Revenue Authority, where we also interviewed offcials on the
relationship between local and central taxation. Furthermore, representatives from the donor
community were interviewed,
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Appendix 4: Central Government Taxation and Tax
Administration
This appendix provides a brief presentation of the central governent tax-
collecting agency, Tanzania Revenue Authority, Furthermore, the central tax
system, including the major tax bases and their revenue productivity, is outline d,
The central government tax administration
Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) became operative on 1 July 1996, the
beginning of the fiscal year 1996/97, TRA replaced the former independent
Treasury Departments oflncome Tax Deparment, Customs Department and Sales
Tax and Inland Revenue, and also the Institute ofTax Administration (ITA).
The revenue departments within TRA are:
1. V AT and Inland Revenue Department (responsible for V AT and excise
duties on domestic goods),
2. Income Tax Department (responsible for direct taxes, including P A YE,
company taxes, withholding taxes, and personal income taxes).
3, Customs Department (responsible for import duties and excise duties on
imported goods),
In addition, the Authority has seven support departments:
(1) Tax Audit and Investigation,
(2) Finance and Human Resource,
(3) Information Technology,
(4) Publicity and Taxpayers Education,
(5) Intemal Audit.
(6) Legal Affairs,
(7) Research and Policy.
TRA is set up as an autonomous agency of Governent reporting to the Minister
of Finance, and operates under the supervision of a Board of Directors, The
Commissioner General is the Chief Executive of the Authority, TRA's main
functions are to administer, assess, collect and account for all revenues due under
Tanzania's tax laws, and to advise the Ministry of Finance (MoF), inter alia, both
on changes to those laws and fiscal policy in general. The TRA-act provides for
retention of a percentage of target revenue collected by the Authority as shall be
determined by the MoF from time to time, The principal objective of TRA is to
increasing the revenues accruing to Governent. The revenue target (T) for fiscal
1998/99 was TSh 699,521 millon, equivalent to a T/GDP ratio of 13 percent
(Budget Speech 1998/99, para. 30),
The central government tax structure
The central governent tax structure and its changes over the last 20 years are
shown in Table A4.1 and A4.2, The composition of taxes has fluctuated much
since fiscal year (FY) 1989/90, In FY 1991/92, for instance, there was a
considerable drop in direct tax revenues (on income and wealth), mainly caused
by reduced revenues from company taxes. In FY 1992/93 there was a significant
69
drop in revenues from indirect taxes, on both domestic goods and services and
international transactions, partly caused by reduced tax rates introduced as part of
the then ongoing tax reforms, In the more recent fiscal years 1995/96, i 996/97
and 1997/98 the share of tax revenues between the three main categories have
been fairly stable;
. taxes on income and wealth contribute with approximately 30 percent of
total tax revenue;
. taxes on international transactions contribute with approximately 30
percent; and
. taxes on domestic goods and services about 25 percent of total tax
revenues,
In addition, "other taxes" (mainly road toll and stamp duty) contribute with about
15 percent oftotal tax revenues, However, this share is likely to be reduced in the
future since stamp duty from FY 1998/99 was partly incorporated into the V A T-
system,
Indirect taxes
The main source of tax revenue is taxes on goods and services. These taxes
inc1ude value added tax (VA T), excise duties and import duties. From table A4,l
we see that the share of import duties collected at the border first fell in the early
1980s and then rose substantially in the latter half of the decade, reflecting both
increased tax rates and the expansion of imports accompanying the early phase of
the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) , The abolItion of export taxes in
1985/86 (inc1uded in "other taxes on international transactions") was more than
compensated for by the considerable growth of sales and excise taxes levied on
imports. In fact, all of the growth in sales and excise taxes over this period is
accounted for by taxes on imports, In 1992/93, however, there was a significant
drop in revenues from taxes on international transactions, partly due to reduced
rates, This was also the case for indirect taxes on domestic goods and services,
During FY 1993/94 and 1994/95 tax revenues from these bases have stayed
almost at the 1992/93 leve! relative to total tax revenues and GDP (see table
A4.2), However, in FY 1995/96 the revenue share of taxes on international
transactions increased to about 30 percent, mainly due to improved tax
enforcement by the administration,
Direct taxes
Direct taxes are, according to the Income Tax Act of 1973, c1assified into four
main categories:
1, Corporation tax.
2, Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE),
3, Individual income tax,
4. Withholding taxes,
In addition, a charge known as "Payrolllevy" is specified in the payroll Levy Act
of 1985, This levy is charged at 4 percent of employees' emoluments paid by
70
employers other than the governent and charitable NGOs, The charge is levied
on the gross wage bill of employers with four or more employees. The gross wage
bill inc1udes wages, salaries, leave pay, sick pay, fees, commissions, bonus,
gratuity and any subsistence, travelling, entertainment or any other allowance paid
by the employer.
. In recent years taxes on income and wealth have contributed with 25-30
percent of total tax revenues,
. By far the biggest source of income tax revenue is the company income
tax, representing 40 percent of total income tax revenue in FY 1996/97 and
1997/98, and more than i 1 percent of total tax revenues,
. Most personal income taxes are collected from P A YE (pay-as-you-earn),
P A YE is a technique, which charge a third party, usually the employer,
with the tasks of deducting the tax from the payment (wages and salaries)
made to the taxpayer (employee), and remitting the proceeds to the
governent. Ideally, the tax withheld should equal the tax due. In most
low income countries the personal income tax system encompasses only a
relatively small part of the potential tax base, usually, the civil service and
parastatal sectors employees where withholding systems may function, In
1997/98 PAYE contributed with approximately 30 percent oftotal income
tax revenues, corresponding to 8.4 percent of total tax revenues, This share
is almost unchanged from the mid- i 980s, although there has been large
fluctuations in revenues generated from this source in the intermediate
period, Revenues from individuals reporting their own income tax fies
represented less than 7 percent of total income taxes in FY 1997/98,
corresponding to less than 2 percent of total tax revenues,
. Since 1992/93, income taxes have increased their relative importance, and
now contribute with approximately the same share of total tax revenues
(about 30 percent) and GDP (above 3 percent) as taxes on international
transactions,
Other taxes
The most import revenue bases within this group are Road Fund Tax (RFT) and
stamp duty, The "road toll" was renamed to Road Fund Tax in July 1999 to make
the name reflecting the purpose of the tax, Part of the stamp duty was incorporated
in the V AT-system in FY 1998/99, In addition, motor vehic1e taxes and property
taxes are inc1uded. In recent years, this revenue source has generated about 14
percent of total tax revenues, corresponding to less than 2 percent of GDP, Part of
the stamp duty was incorporated in the V A T -system in FY 1998/99. Revenues
from stamp duties will therefore dec1ine, Tentatively, comparing data for the first
6 months of FY 1998/99 with the corresponding figures from FY 1997/98, the
dec1ine is about 60 percent. In principle, however, this dec1ine in stamp duty-
revenues should be recovered through the V AT -system.
Non-tax revenue
The most important components of this revenue source are revenues generated by
Regions and Ministries (e,g" sa1es of Governent stores and vehic1es, fees and
charges from the police force, home affairs, tourism, etc,), and parastatal
71
dividends (mainly from Bank of Tanzania), It also inc1udes appropriation in aid,
In recent years, this base has contributed with revenues corresponding to about 1,5
percent ofGDP,
Summary
To sum up, Tanzania's central governent tax base by the late 1990s appears to
rest on three sources, The first is the "traditional" excise and sales tax base of the
so-called "demerit goods", i.e, beer, tobacco, spirits and so on, The second source
is taxes on imports, particularly consumer goods, and the third is taxes on
company profits and personal income (P A YE),
72
T
a
bl
e 
A4
.1
 T
he
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
 o
f 
ce
nt
ra
l 
go
ve
rn
me
nt
 t
ax
at
io
n,
 1
97
9-
98
 (
in
 p
er
ce
nt
 o
f 
to
ta
l c
en
tra
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t t
ax
es
)
Ta
xe
s o
n 
in
co
m
e 
an
d 
w
ea
lth
36
.2
29
.1
27
.8
18
.8
31
.0
26
.5
26
.6
29
.2
26
.6
28
.3
PA
Y
E
10
.3
9,
0
4,
3
3.
2
6,
7
7.
6
8.
4
In
di
vi
du
al
s
2.
4
2.
4
2,
0
1.
9
1.
4
1.
8
1.
7
Co
m
pa
ni
es
21
.6
15
,7
19
.0
13
,7
12
.4
10
,8
11
.5
O
th
er
1.
9
2.
0
2,
5
Ta
xe
s 
on
 d
om
es
tie
 g
oo
ds
 a
nd
41
.8
54
.5
44
.0
40
.9
31
.5
31
.9
33
.1
24
.9
25
.5
24
.8
se
rv
ic
es S
a1
es
 a
nd
 e
xc
is
e 
ta
x 
- 
lo
ca
i1
40
.2
51
.2
37
.4
40
,9
O
th
er
1.
6
3.
3
6.
6
Ta
xe
s o
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l
22
.0
16
.4
28
.2
28
.7
21
.6
22
.8
24
.0
31
.6
33
.1
31
.9
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
Im
po
rt 
du
tie
s
11
.9
8,
8
14
,3
14
,8
10
,8
16
.0
15
.4
14
.4
Sa
le
s a
nd
 e
xc
ise
 ta
x 
- i
m
po
rts
3,
0
7.
4
13
,7
13
,9
10
,8
15
,6
16
,8
17
.5
O
th
er
2
7.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
1
0.
1
O
t
he
r 
ta
xe
s3
11
.6
15
.9
18
.7
16
.3
14
.2
14
.8
14
.1
V
 A
T 
re
p1
ac
ed
 sa
1e
s t
ax
 in
 F
Y
 1
99
8/
99
 (i
ntr
od
uc
ed
 1 
Ju
1y
 19
98
),
2 
In
cl
ud
es
 e
xp
or
t d
ut
y.
3 
Th
e 
m
os
t i
m
po
rta
nt
 b
as
es
 in
 th
is 
ca
te
go
ry
 a
re
 st
am
p 
du
ty
 a
nd
 ro
ad
 to
ll 
(re
na
me
d t
o R
oa
d F
un
d T
ax
 in
 19
98
), I
t a
1s
o i
nc
lud
es 
mo
tor
 ve
hic
le 
tax
es 
an
d
pr
op
er
t t
ax
es
.
So
ur
ce
: F
jel
ds
tad
 et
 aL
. (1
99
9)
Ta
bl
e 
A4
,2
 S
tru
ct
ur
e 
of
 c
en
tra
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t t
ax
at
io
n,
 1
97
9-
98
 (in
 pe
rce
nt 
ofG
DP
)
Ta
xe
s o
n 
in
co
m
e 
an
d 
4,
5
w
ea
lth
Sa
le
s a
nd
 e
xc
ise
 ta
xe
s
7.
7
8,
7
8.
4
9,
1
9,
1
10
.4
11
.4
3,
6
4.
4
4.
4
4.
8
5.
2
4,
9
Im
po
rt 
du
tie
s
1.
1
2.
1
2,
0
2.
3
2,
5
2,
6
3,
1
2,
5
3,
1
3.
2
1.
9
1.
9
1.
7
O
th
er
 ta
xe
s
0,
7
0,
8
1.
6
1.
7
1,
8
1.
5
2.
4
1.
8
2,
6
2.
2
1.
7
1.
8
1.
7
Ta
x 
re
ve
nu
es
14
15
.4
16
.3
19
.8
18
.2
18
.1
20
.8
11
.5
13
.6
13
.3
11
.9
12
.2
11
.6
N
on
-ta
x 
re
ve
nu
e
0.
7
0.
9
1.
7
1.
8
1.
8
1.
6
2.
7
1.
4
1.
4
1.
4
2.
0
1.
6
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
14
.7
16
.3
17
.1
21
.6
19
.9
19
.7
23
.5
12
.9
15
.0
14
.7
13
.9
13
.8
To
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
23
.1
27
.1
25
.3
28
.7
26
.7
35
.3
26
.4
26
.7
25
.4
19
.5
D
ef
ici
t b
ef
or
e 
gr
an
ts
(8.
4)
(10
.8)
(8.
2)
(7.
1)
(6.
6)
(15
.6)
(2.
9)
(13
.8)
(10
.4)
(4.
8)
D
ef
ici
t a
fte
r g
ra
nt
s
(8.
3)
(5.
7)
(3.
1)
So
ur
ce
: F
jel
ds
tad
 et
 al
, (I
 99
9)
